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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF
EARLY CHILDHOOD HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT
SEPTEMBER 2016
ANDY BARENBERG
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-KANSAS CITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Arindrajit Dube
This three-paper dissertation examines the social determinants of early child-
hood and in-utero health. The first chapter examines the impact of early childhood
stunting on educational outcome in Tanzania. Using the extent of third-trimester
overlap with the Tanzania hunger season to create an exogenous variation in stunting,
I find that a one standard deviation stunting decreases educational achievement by
.88 school years compared to a child’s siblings. A placebo group not affected by the
hunger season is used to confirm that in-utero nutrition deprivation is the cause of the
education differences. The second paper utilizes the food price shocks and price in-
creases to examine the impact of nutritional sufficiency on child development in four
vi
sub-Saharan countries. I find adverse effects of third-trimester and early-childhood
exposure to food price increases, but get inconsistent results on infancy that requires
additional research. The final paper uses an instrumental variable method to deter-
mine the impact of public health spending on infant mortality in India. The results
imply that a one percent of state-level GDP increase in public health prevents seven
children deaths for every 1,000 live births. Together the three papers highlight the
possible role investments in early childhood health could have in increasing human
capabilities and well-being.
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation consists of three papers on the social determinants of early child-
hood and in-utero health of children and the impacts that has on their later health
outcomes. Although all three papers focus on less developed countries, I believe the
lessons are more broadly applicable. My research here, and the growing body of
existing literature on early childhood, highlight the extent that the implications of
early childhood health has been vastly underestimated.
An example of the underestimation is the current political debates about inner-
city violence, which I believe provides a valuable parable of the motives and themes
of my research. Inner-city crime became a key focus at Donald Trump’s 2016 Re-
publican National Convention. Since then numerous commentators have noted that
violent crime in the United States has actually decreased dramatically since the
1990s (Marshall Project, 2016), but few have discussed the influence of early child-
hood health in why crime has decreased. The causes of the decreases highlight the
importance of research on early childhood health, its role in the wealth and inequal-
ity of a nation, and the depravity of our tendency to blame the victims of societies
inequities.
During the higher crime rates of the 1990s Trump’s current electoral opponent,
Hillary Clinton, sounded the same themes as he does today: “They are often the kinds
of kids that are called super-predators,” she said (Gearan and Phillip, 2016). “No
conscience, no empathy, we can talk about why they ended up that way, but first we
have to bring them to heel.” In 1994, her husband, President Bill Clinton, pushed
through a crime bill that focused on increasing police forces and incarcerations.
Similarly, cities and mayors focused on getting tough on crime policies -most notably
from Rudy Giuliani in New York City. Policies of mass incarcerations followed the
trends started in the 1980s in a failed effort to thwart the growing crime epidemic.
By 1990, one in four black males in their twenties were under some version of criminal
justice supervision. The Sentencing Project estimated the government cost of the
incarceration at $6 billion, a number that leaves out the incredible toll on the lives
of those involved (Mauer and Huling, 1995). Today, the move to mass incarceration
keeps over 400,000 individuals behind bars, over ten times higher than in 1980.
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While the costs of these policies piled up, evidence of their success was not forth-
coming. As Manzi (2012) notes in reviewing the period, criminology regressions
struggled to explain 10-20% of variation, and both regression analysis and random-
ized controlled trails of criminal policies rarely found same results when replicated.
Recent research on incarceration finds that the increased recidivism of those im-
prisoned outweighs the deterrent and detainment effects to increase crime (Mueller-
Smith, 2014). However, as the numerous efforts seemed fruitless, suddenly and unex-
pectedly, the crimerate started to go down, seemingly unconnected to any standard
explanation of causes of crimes rates.
In 2000, Rick Nevin proposed a new explanation for the sudden turnaround in
crime trends. Looking at data going back to 1900, Nevin found that trends in
crime rates correlated with exposure to lead and gasoline paint (Nevin, 2000). Lead
exposure in early childhood had been known to reduce IQ and the ability to control
emotions. It was plausible that children exposed to lead would be more likely to be
predisposed to violence later in life. Seven years after Nevin’s publication, Jessica
Wolpaw Reyes published her dissertation linking lead to crime. Armed with state-
level data, she was able to show that drops in crime corresponded to when leaded
gasoline was phased out at the state level, with a 20-30 year lag (Reyes, 2007). Her
estimates implied that decreases in lead explained more than half of the reduction in
crime. That year, Nevin returned with a second paper, showing that the relationship
between lead exposure and early childhood and murder produced a similar strong
fit in Britain, Canada, France, Australia, Finland, Italy, West Germany, and New
Zealand, in addition to the United States (Nevin, 2007). When researchers looked at
the neighborhood level in New Orleans (Mielke and Zahran, 2012) or followed several
hundred individuals through time in Cincinnati (Wright et al., 2008), they found the
same trends: exposure to high concentrations of lead in infancy were correlated to
higher rates of aggravated assault in adulthood.
As I stated at the start of this introduction, I find this story to be a parable of
my motives for the research contained in this dissertation. In the face of a seemingly
intractable social ill of violent crime, politicians had reached for simple answers:
more police, increased incarceration, bringing “superpredators to heel,” and so on.
These purported solutions not only failed to control crime, but they also came at an
incredible cost, ripped at the fabric of society, and put the poor and the marginalized
in conflict with the authorities. However, the trends did reverse, not because of any
crime policy but because of a decision to protect the health of children.
To me, the question of early childhood health goes beyond the broad impacts of
wealth and well-being of a nation as a whole, but also directly tied to the ethical
question of equality. For example, the concentrations of lead dust in the air rose
higher in urban areas where the poor and black lived, and the resulting crime struck
their communities harder than the rest (Mielke and Zahran, 2012). As the wealthier
are better able to protect their young from the environmental harm and invest in their
health, early childhood health becomes and important means via which inequality
is transmitted from generation to generation. Janet Currie (2011) notes that the
majority of differences in adult wages that economists can explain can be explained by
a few variables on childhood background and score on standardized tests at age seven.
Despite our love of pull-yourself-up-by-your-bootstraps stories, adult outcomes are
largely determined by inequities in early childhood.
Compounding the injury of health disparities is the insult that the resulting
differences in outcomes are the fault of the victims. At the height of the crime
wave anxiety of the 1990s, Herrnstein and Murray published the Bell Curve (1996),
arguing that IQ is mostly immutable and genetically determined. Their argument
was that exogenously determined IQ explains the vast disparity of incomes and that
social policy needed to accept that there was little that could be done. The same
theory has also been given more scholarly treatment. Cunha and Heckman (2007)
note that in Becker’s (1993) comparison of human capital models to ability models,
he assumes thatability is created purely by nature.
Herrnstein and Murray’s argument was that the lower incomes of certain families
and racial groups that persist from generation to generation are the result of inferior
innate ability. My contention is that causation flows in the other direction, that
inequality and poverty shape capabilities, and that any comments on the role of
genetics are, at best, beyond the current state of our knowledge. To support their
argument, Herrnstein and Murray used studies of identical twins raised separately
to argue that genetics play a larger part than environment. My research in this
dissertation helps illuminate the fatal flaw in such arguments. In Chapters 1 and
2, I show how the in-utero environment is a key determinant of the health and
development of a child. If a shared in-utero environment plays a significant role in
the formation of cognitive capabilities, as I argue in Chapter 1, these studies would be
systematically flawed. Since adoptions commonly follow an unplanned and resource-
strained pregnancy, this could play a significant influence in biasing these studies.
The differences in outcomes are likely the result of inequities during gestation and
claims that they show genetics as a scurrilous return to the claims of eugenics.
The tendency to incorrectly explain the outcomes of the social environment as
being genetic extends to the key measure I use in Chapters 1 and 2, the children’s
Height-for-Age Z-score (HAZ). To create this score, a child’s height is compared with
the 2006 WHO growth standards. For the creation of these standards, the WHO
collected data on 8,440 healthy breastfed infants and young children from Brazil,
Ghana, India, Norway, Oman, and the U.S. In order to ensure the children grew to
their genetic potential, before birth pregnant mother’s were selected that would be
raising the child in a clean (non-smoking and open defecation-free) and nutritionally
sufficient environment.
It could be thought - and it is most people’s intuition - that the reason why some
countries’ height distributions are below the WHO standards is the result of genetic–
not nutritional– differences. Many may find it implausible that there are no genetic
differences that explain the differences in the average height of the Guatemalan Maya
population and the US population, but this is indeed the case. Mayan children
forced to flee from Guatemala to the US in the 1980s saw their growth accelerate
(Smith et al., 2003). After eight years, their average height was near that of the
US population. On average, Mayan children that grew up in the US were 10.2 cm
taller than their Guatemalan counterparts,and only 13.7% were stunted compared
to 71.6% in Guatemala.
A recent defense of the genetic argument in scholarly literature is foundin Pana-
gariya (2013), who argued that WHO standards were inappropriate to assessthe
Indian sub-continent. His concern was that the utilization of this standard was ma-
ligning the neo-liberal reforms that had brought growth but little change inthe HAZ
scores. His argument was one of incredulity; surely, India’s lower height distribution
compared to poor Sub-Saharan African nations could not be the result of malnu-
trition. Panagariya argued it was implausible that India had worse nutrition when
India outperformed these countries in per-capita GDP, female literacy, and health
indicators such as infant mortality and life expectancy.
“[W]hat is needed,” he argued, “is evidence that some sub-populations of children
born and raised in India have managed to eliminate the gap with the WHO 2006
reference population.” The evidence that Panagariya demanded could be found
by reading the WHO report on the creation of the standards (Onis, 2007). The
report includes the results from 1791 Indian children included in the study, and in
no age group were Indian children (or children from any other countries) significantly
different from the pooled averages. Over 70% of the variation in heights was due
to differences between individuals within a site, and only 3% of the variation from
came from differences between sites. Of the 54 country and age group categories, the
report considers that no country’s mean is greater than .5 SD from the mean, and
only 10 are greater than .3 SD. The report notes that these differences “are relatively
minor and are likely of little, if any, practical and/or clinical importance”(Onis, 2007,
p. 61).
Pangariya’s argument on the role of genetics is by residual, he assumes that “if
we cannot think of anything else, it must be genetics. There is no direct evidence on
genetics anywhere in the paper” Tarozzi et al. (2013). But in six separate responding
paper numerous alternative explanations are provided. Regional differences within
India of rates of stunting correspond with rates of open defecation, which, due to
population density, would have a much higher impact than in African countries
(Spears et al., 2013; Buttenheim, 2008; Tarozzi et al., 2013). First born Indian
children are taller than their African counterparts, it is the children who are lower
in the birth order who drive the differences (Jayachandran and Pande, 2013; Coffey,
2013). This result is possibly driven by declining female bargaining power and, hence,
lower nutritional status after the birth of the first child. Contrary to Panagriya’s
implication that India’s growth should have eliminated widespread malnutrition, 70%
of Indian children suffer from anemia, and micro-nutrient deficiencies are widespread
(Lodha et al., 2013; Gupta et al., 2013). Similar to the Mayan case, Tarozzi (2008)
finds that “children of Indian ethnicity who live in the UK have anthropometric
outcomes comparable to [WHO] standards.”
The key point here is not the specifics of the Indian case but the overall conclusion
that regional genetic differences do not explain regional height differences. It is likely
that genetics plays a significant role in defining an individual’s potential height, but
there is no evidence these genetic differences are distributed geographically. Research
has consistently found that when any sufficiently large population is given a healthy,
growing environment, it takes on a distribution resembling the international WHO
standard. As such, the finding of a height distribution systematically below the
WHO standard should be interpreted as evidence of nutritional or health barriers
preventing the achievement of potential. That such extreme height differences seem
so obviously linked to regional genetic differences but are, in fact not, should give
pause to any other claim that differences are driven by genetics. Instead, it highlights
the extreme difference in outcomes that arise from children’s social environment and
the potential that remains for substantial improvements in human development.
This point is magnified by examining the consequences of this stunting. A sub-
stantial and growing literature has established that a low HAZ score is a good indi-
cator of not only physical growth stunting but also impaired cognitive development.
Several studies from Brazil focusing on the role of diarrhea in early childhood cog-
nitive development found a relationship between HAZ scores and aptitude tests and
school outcomes (Niehaus et al., 2002; Alderman et al., 2006b; Dillingham and Guer-
rant, 2004). From 1960 to 1998, the Institute of Nutrition of Central America and
Panama (INCAP) conducted experiments that gavenutritionally at-risk children nu-
tritional supplementsandcomparedthemwith control groups with follow-up anthro-
pometric measurements and cognitive tests. The study found that lower physical
development stemmingfrom malnutrition strongly correlated with lower cognitive
development, which seemingly persists permanently (Engle and Ferna´ndez, 2010).
Similarly, Alderman et al. (2006a) havefound that “improvements in height-for-age
in preschoolers are associated with increased height as a young adult and number of
grades of schooling completed.”
The existing economic literature provides two philosophical frameworks to con-
sider investments in children’s health. The first is Human Capital theory, as devel-
oped by Becker (1993) and Grossman (1972). The second is the capabilities approach
first promoted by Sen (1980, 1993) and given mathematical treatment by Cunha and
Heckman (2007). I follow the latter approach. There are multiple reasons I prefer
the capability approach. First, I believe the word capital should not be applied to
something that is embedded in an individual, and can not be utilized except via
their labor. Unlike physical capital, human capital can earn wealth while one is on
vacation, nor can it be liquefied and transferred to new industries when markets are
preferences change. Without these characteristics, “capital” is reduced from the vi-
brant role it played in Marx’s theories to meaning just “something that will increase
output in the future.” A second concern is the limited utilitarian view of human
health. As Sen (1980) argued, human health is not just a means to an end, but key
end onto itself. A person’s health is an essential aspect of wellbeing, and should not
be regard simply as a tool for increasing wealth. A final and related philosophical
complaint against the human capital theory is its moral nihilism: the moral question
of if a child is entitled to food should not rest on the same calculus that determines
if a robot is to be oiled.
In addition to the philosophical differences between human capital and capability
approaches, there are also fundamental differences that arise from the mathematical
model used to represent the theories. These differences are critical to understanding
the implication of my research. In the standard human capital model of health first
presented in Grossman (1972) the stock of human capital is given by the equation
Ht = (1−δ)Ht−1+It where I is investment in human capital and δ is the depreciation
rate. Almond and Currie (2011) note that, according to this model, even with low
rates of depreciation the effects of differences at birth would be trivial by the time the
individual reached working age. Recently economists have begun to reconsider the
importance of early childhood in later life outcomes in ways that cannot be captured
by Grossman’s model.
Cunha and Heckman (2007) provides an alternative conceptual model for analyz-
ing the development of human capabilities. We can consider a vector (H) of capa-
bilities of a person-which can include cognitive, non-cognitive and physical health-as
being determined in a point of time by environmental and background variables
(E), parental factors (P), and by constant elasticity of substitution model between
investments in different ages.
Ht+1 = f(E,P,A[λI
ρ
t−1 + (1− λ)Iρt ]1/ρ)
Cunha and Heckman define a sensitive period as
∂Ht+1
∂It∗ >
∂Ht+1
∂Is
for all s that is not t*. A critical period on the other hand is defined as
∂Ht+1
∂Is
= 0
for all periods not t* but for t*
∂Ht+1
∂It∗ > 0
.
According to the fetal origins hypothesis, the time in utero is, for some aspects
of the vector H, a particularly sensitive period. Between earlier and later semesters
of the pregnancy the later periods could be a sensitive period despite a high level
of substitution between the periods. When a shock happens early in the pregnancy,
the remaining time in utero can compensate for the effect; but, when shocks come
later, there is no time to compensate. In other words, since the early trimesters are
followed by periods with a high level of substitution (still being in utero), highly
responsive compensating investments remain possible. On the other hand, later in
the pregnancy, the post-natal period that follows has lower levels of substitution.
Hence, compensating for a shock becomes more difficult at this stage of pregnancy.
The impact of a shock when investments are fixed would be:
∂Ht+1
∂µ
= λA[λ(I¯t−1 + µ)ρ + (1− λ)I¯ρt ]1−ρ/ρ(I¯ + µ)ρ−1
Currie and Almond (2011) and Almond and Mazumder (2013) note that this
implies the effects of a shock on a lower income family are likely to be higher, because
the family’s baseline investments will generally be lower and, hence, on a steeper
section of the production function.
Cunha and Heckman call lambda (λ) the skill multiplier because through it in-
vestment at earlier age influences current health not only directly but also by influ-
encing the returns of investment at a later time. Because of this, the model can have
dynamic complementaries. This is when
∂2Ht(H, I)
∂HtIt
> 0
investments (or shocks) can increase (or decrease) the ability of an individual to
learn or finish school.
We cannot observe this productivity of later investments directly but we can
observe the outcomes that result. The observed impact (∂Ht+1
∂µ
) is not merely the
result of biology but also the response of later investments in response to the shock
(∂It+1
∂µ
). These later investments can be compensatory (∂It+1
∂µ
> 0) or reinforcing
(∂It+1
δµ
< 0). If the investment response is compensatory, and the compensating
investment is not costless, an examination of the later effects would underestimate
the cost of the initial shocks.
The parents’ response function to early childhood shock will depend on the pro-
duction function, their own preferences, and their resources and access to liquidity.
Even where parents hold strong inequality aversion, a low level of substitution in
the production function could make reinforcing investments optimal. Almond and
Mazumder (2013) argue that the “bulk of empirical evidence to date suggest that
parental investments reinforce initial endowment differences.” But other studies find
parental investments to be compensating. For example Behrman (1988); Pitt et al.
(1990) demonstrate, in separate studies, that inequality aversion is a major feature
in the allocation of food in households in India. Almond and Mazumder (2013) note
that “parental responses could differ across these dimensions [of the vector H of health
capabilities]. For example, it could be that parents might prefer to compensate for
health endowments but reinforce cognitive ability endowments.”
In Chapter One I am examining what Cunga and Heckman refer to as self-
productivity. Self-productivity is the ability of health and capabilities to result in
greater levels of health and productivities in later period. Formally self productivity
is:
∂2Ht(Ht, It, E, P )
∂Ht−1
> 0
The key problem in empirically estimating self productivity is that the various
environmental and background factors (E) and parental (P) factors that influence
Ht−1 will also independently influence Ht. To solve this we need an exogenous source
of variation in Ht−1 that is not correlated with E and P.
Separating out these environmental, parental, and background factors is the mo-
tivation for examining the effects of third trimester overlap with the hunger season
in the first chapter. In order to correctly estimate the impact of early childhood
stunting it is necessary to have an exogenous variation not correlated with these
other factors. I show that third trimester exposure to the hunger season results in
negative shock in health that can be seen in under-5 height for age z-scores, a finding
replicated in second chapter. The use of these shocks allows estimation of impacts
that are exogenous to the conditions of the household. By combining this instrument
with household fixed effects I purge any correlation between it and environmental,
background and parental factors that is fixed through time. There could be concern
that timing of birth could be correlated with other factors (for example, start of the
school year) which could also influence educational achievement. I will show through
a falsification test using regions that do not have seasonal hunger that this is not the
case.
Previous efforts to research the impact of childhood stunting on educational out-
comes have struggled to overcome the requirement to have an exogenous source of
variation. For example, Alderman et al. (2009) analyze the impact of childhood mal-
nutrition on schooling by instrumenting early childhood nutrition with famines and
civil wars in Zimbabwe. They defend the excludability of this shock through tests of
over-identification, but the validity of the instrument has some inherent implausibil-
ity. Certainly growing up after a civil war or famine as opposed to during one will
effect future education in more ways than just nutritional status. Yamauchi (2012),
like my model in the first paper, uses season of birth in Indonesia to instrument birth
weight; he finds that higher birth weight correlates with an earlier start to school and
fewer grades repeated. However, his paper does not incorporate a household fixed
effect (possibly due to small sample size), requiring greater faith that month of birth
is not correlated with socio-economic factors. I will show that this assumption is
not valid for the Tanzanian case. By combining season of birth and household fixed
effects, and providing a test of possible falsification I provide clear identification that
effects are causal then previous research.
That sensitivity of the third trimester in utero to nutritional deprivation is rein-
forced by the second chapter, which finds a negative impact on children’s height-for-
age when the third trimester overlaps with food price crisis or food price rises. In
the second chapter, I find a log point increase in local prices in the third-trimester
in-utero corresponds with a 1.20 decrease in height-for-age Z-scores. In Tanzania the
hunger season often sees local prices increases of up to 30 percent, according to the
estimate in chapter one this should result in a .31 standard deviation decrease in the
height-for-age. This effect is nearly identical to .29 finding in chapter one.
In Ethiopia and Malawi, which had significant local food price increases, third-
trimester overlap with the crises caused decreases in height of .69 and .82 standard
deviations respectively. These decreases are indicative that these two food price
crises took a substantially larger toll than what we see from the seasonal hunger in
Tanzania, but similar when scaled by the extent of the price swings. If the results
from chapter one are externally valid for Ethiopia and Malawi, then they would imply
that children whose third-trimester in-utero overlapped with the local crises would
see decreased educational achievement of .61 and .72 grades completed, respectively.
The worst hit cohort would be children born in August 2008 in Ethiopia. These
children would experience the food price crisis both in third-trimester in-utero and
throughout infancy. They will on average be a full standard deviation shorter and will
on average complete .88 fewer grades of school. This is an incredible and substantial
cost for failing to ensure food security for the population.
The comparability of the outcomes found in chapter one and chapter two are
interesting in that causes were rather different in nature. The food price shocks
studied in chapter two were a sudden, unprecedented shock on the global scale. In
contrast, the seasonal shock of chapter one is a predictable yearly event. Indeed,
a remarkable aspect of these effects is that they are an additional effect on top of
preexisting levels of stunting in these populations. For children in Ethiopia born
during the crisis the average height-for-age is below 2 standards deviations below the
healthy population mean. That is, the mean of this population meets the medical
definition of being stunted. But even if we look at the population not affected by
the crises in Ethiopia the average HAZ scores are 1.5 standard deviations below the
mean of a non-deprived population. This baseline needs to be kept in mind when
considering the potential impact investment in child health could have. Efforts that
just lower the day-to-day hunger or small seasonal variations in food access, could
have potentially significant impacts on health and life outcomes.
Often the criticism is made that while it is easy to find the harms of ill-health,
creating solutions is far more challenging. Even if ill-health has substantial negative
impacts, government failure might make seemingly self-evident policies to fail cost
effectiveness evaluation. This was the conclusion that Filmer and Pritchett (1999)
came to in analyzing the impact of public health spending in developing countries.
My third chapter directly counters this view. Co-authored with Deepankar Basu and
Ceren Soylu, the paper examines the role that public health expenditures can play
in decreasing infant mortality. Using a panel dataset of Indian States from 1983-
84 to 2011-2012,we examine public health expenditures using a measure fiscal space
available to the state. We find that an increase in state expenditure of one percent of
the states domestic product causes a decrease of approximately seven infant deaths
per 1000 live births. These results were subjected to a large battery of robustness
checks that ruled out other possible pathways between fiscal space and decreased
infant mortality.
Our results imply an elasticity of infant mortality the health spending of -.36.
In contrast, Filmer and Pritchett’s study (1999) found an elasticity of only -.07.
Our higher estimate would dramatically change Filmer and Pritchett’s cost benefit
analysis. But any cost benefit analysis should take in more than infant mortality
rates. Although our paper shows public health spending is effective at lowering
mortality, there is so much more to health than preventing death. The public health
spending included spending family welfare and nutrition. This spending will not
only prevent death but also enhance the well being of lives, and development of the
children’s capabilities.
The lesson of that final chapter is that we should not be so quick to seize evi-
dence that there is nothing to be done, that government is powerless to alleviate the
harms of poverty and malnutrition. Given what I have found on the relationship
of early childhood health and education, countries that give up on early childhood
health to focus on budgets do so at their peril. Such shortsighted policies will not
only adversely affect their population today, but by limiting the development of the
capabilities of their population, stunt the future growth of the nation.
CHAPTER 1
EFFECTS OF EARLY CHILDHOOD STUNTING ON
SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE
TANZANIA HUNGER SEASON
1.1 Abstract
This paper uses seasonal variation in food availability in Tanzania and the month
of a childs birth to examine the impacts of early childhood stunting on later health
and educational outcomes. Utilizing a combination of Two-Sample 2SLS models
with and without household fixed effects, I derive estimates for the impact of early
childhood stunting on later growth, body mass index, and educational achievement.
I find that having third trimester in-utero overlap with the hunger season causes
early childhood height to be decreased by .3 standard deviations. Of this stunting,
only a statistically insignificant 21% persist into later childhood but with a higher
resulting body mass index. These results give evidence that later investments can
help compensate for earlier stunting. Turning to education outcomes, I find that
malnutrition associated with a one standard deviation decrease in under-5 height
causes a statistically significant .88 year decrease in future grades completed. To
support the argument that the decrease in education is caused by in utero malnutri-
tion, I show that in the Zanzibar & coastal urban regions that do not have seasonal
hunger there is no decrease in educational achievement. These results imply that
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the decreases in under-5 stunting that occurred between 1990 and 2010 will result in
6.6% increase in years of education for the Tanzanian children. If this trend were to
continue to where the mean child in Tanzania was the same height as the mean child
raised without nutritional constraints, they would on average complete 1.22 more
years of schooling, a 15% increase.
1.2 Introduction
In the standard model of human capital accumulation the effect of a negative
shock on human capital depreciates over time. For any non-trivial rate of depre-
ciation, the effect of a shock in early childhood or while in-utero would be largely
non-existent by the time they reach adulthood. Recently this model has come un-
der question, as economists have begun to consider not only how shocks directly
affect the capacity of a child, but also how they can influence the effectiveness of
future developments of these capabilities. Additionally, economists are considering
the possibility that certain periods are particularly sensitive or critical to human
development and that the effects of mal-development may not be possible to reverse
in later periods.
This paper adds to our understanding of the importance of early childhood devel-
opment by using the hunger season in Tanzania to show that the effects of stunting
in early childhood can influence the ability to acquire skills later in life. I show that
a one standard deviation stunting in under-five height results in .88 fewer years of
education completed compared to non-stunted siblings. I show that this effect on
education persists despite the children largely being able to eliminate the height gap
with catch-up growth. I derive these results using time of birth and the extent of
third trimester overlap with the Tanzania hunger season to get an exogenous source
of variation in stunting. To confirm that the results are not driven by a spurious
correlation, I create a falsification test using regions that do not experience the sea-
sonal hunger. By utilizing individuals who migrated from regions of seasonal hunger
to areas without seasonal hunger in comparison to the local populations of the lat-
ter regions, I show that the results are driven solely by the experience of in-utero
malnutrition. I also use a bounding procedure to rule out the possibility that the
stunting effect of the seasonal shock in the first stage is driven by sample selection
from selective mortality.
Recent papers such as Majid (2013); Schultz-Nielsen et al. (2014) and Almond
and Mazumder (2011) have used Ramadan to study the impact of in-utero malnutri-
tion on later life outcomes. This paper confirms these results with the added value
of examining a unique source of variation. But this paper also studies the impact of
under-five stunting, a broadly used indicator of physical health and nutrition. Pre-
vious efforts to estimate the relationship between stunting and education used either
simple OLS style controls (Hoddinott et al., 2013) or questionable instruments (Al-
derman et al., 2006a). The Ramadan studies lacked data on early childhood heights
to address these questions. Here, I use Two Sample 2SLS methods (TS2SLS) to
bridge across the different data sets, and consistently estimate the impact of stunting
on schooling while accounting for differences in the characteristics of the two sam-
ples. Importantly, I am able to show that these results are similar when we limit our
comparisons to treated versus untreated siblings within the same household-ruling
out an important source of unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, I explicitly consider,
and rule out a negative spillover effect on siblings arising from compensatory invest-
ments by parents. By comparing within households, providing evidence on sibling
spillovers, and utilizing multiple placebo groups for falsification tests, I am able to
generate a much cleaner identification of the causal effect of childhood stunting on
skill formation than had previously been possible.
1.3 Literature Review
A particular change has taken place on how both the medical profession and
economists consider the impact of in-utero conditions. Up to late 1980s the prevailing
research had suggested that the fetus acted as a perfect parasite and filter, taking
in necessary nutrients while filtering out any toxins. Under such a schema, the
mothers health status had little impact on either the immediate or long-term health
of the fetus. In a series of articles in the 1980s and 1990s the British physician D.J.
Barker (Barker, 2001, 1995; Barker et al., 1989; Barker and Osmond, 1986) argued
that conditions in utero determined later life health outcomes. Barker argued that
conditions such as diabetes, heart disease, and obesity had what he termed fetal
origins. While Barkers fetal origins hypothesis gained traction through the 1990s,
malnourishment was still thought to slow only the physical development of the fetus,
while preserving resources to protect cognitive development. It has only been in the
last 15 years that extensive medical and economics research has demonstrated that
fetal shocks can and do impact cognitive development (Gluckman and Hanson, 2004;
Almond and Mazumder, 2013).
The existing research indicates that shocks to the fetus during the third trimester
of pregnancy in particular can result in significant impacts later in life. Barker (2001,
p. 70) notes that studies of animals show that a fetus that grows slowly throughout
gestation may have the same size at birth as a fetus whose growth was arrested for
a period and then caught up. This is also found in humans. Research by Currie
and Schwandt (2013) associates May births in the United States with lower birth
weights, presumably due to the fact that flu season falls while the child is close to full
term. Lokshin and Radyakin (2012a) observe similar seasonal effects, observing that
children born during the monsoon season in India have height-for-age and weight-
for-age z-scores that are .2 to .4 standard deviations lower.
A more singular, and more extreme, case is discussed by A.D. Stein, A.C. Rav-
elli, and L.H. Lumey (1995). Their research on the Dutch Hunger at the end of
WWII finds a strong correlation between third trimester famine exposure on birth
weight and future health outcome, with less impact from similar exposure in other
trimesters. Because this famine hit all sectors of society in a definite geographical
area, the event allowed Stein et al. to distinguish the effects of acute malnutrition
from other socio-economic factors.
Schultz-Nielsen et al.(2014) provide a snapshot of the impact of cyclical periods
of fasting in their study of Muslims living in Norway. They find that children born at
the time corresponding to the seventh month of pregnancy during the fasting season
of Ramadan results in worse labor market outcomes. This research corresponds
with that of Majid (2013), who shows that children exposed in utero to Ramadan
fasting in Indonesia have lower birth weight, score lower on general aptitude tests,
spend fewer hours studying at school, and work fewer hours as adults. For the results
relating to school achievement, he consistently finds that third trimester exposure has
the strongest effect. For adult outcomes, the relative effect of the various trimesters
varies according to the specification used. (Conversely Almond and Mazumder (2011)
find a negative result of Ramadan fasting corresponds to first trimester exposure.)
A substantial and growing literature has established that a low HAZ score is a
good indicator of not only physical growth stunting but also impaired cognitive de-
velopment. Several studies from Brazil focusing on the role of diarrhea in early child-
hood cognitive development found a relationship between HAZ scores and aptitude
tests and school outcomes Niehaus et al. (2002); Alderman et al. (2006b); Dilling-
ham and Guerrant (2004). From 1960 to 1998, the Institute of Nutrition of Central
America and Panama (INCAP) conducted experiments that gavenutritionally at-risk
children nutritional supplementsandcomparedthemwith control groups with follow-
up anthropometric measurements and cognitive tests. The study found that lower
physical development stemmingfrom malnutrition strongly correlatedwith lower cog-
nitive development, which seemingly persists permanently (Engle and Ferna´ndez,
2010). Similarly, (Alderman et al., 2006a) havefound that “improvements in height-
for-age in preschoolers are associated with increased height as a young adult and
number of grades of schooling completed.”
Research on the impacts of the early childhood stunting is complicated by fact
that the environmental, parental, household and community aspects that determine
a child’s health almost certainly affects other life outcomes in other ways. A require-
ment for causal estimation is to find an exogenous source of variation in health. This
is the motivation for examining the effects of third trimester overlap with the hunger
season. I will show in this papers that third trimester exposure to the hunger season
results in negative shock in health that can be seen in under-5 height for age z-scores.
By using household fixed effects I can purge from this instrument any correlation be-
tween it and environmental, background and parental factors that is fixed through
time. The use of these shocks allows estimation of impacts that are exogenous to
the conditions of the household. There could be concern that timing of birth could
be correlated with other factors (for example, start of the school year) which could
also influence educational achievement. I will show through a falsification test using
regions that do not have seasonal hunger that this is not the case.
1.4 The Data
The data for this paper comes from two distinct survey sets. In the language of
the two-sample 2SLS model I will develop later on I will refer to these two surveys
as the first stage data and the second stage data, respectively. The first stage data
comes from five rounds of the Demographic & Health Surveys conducted in 1991,
1996, 1999, 2006 and 2010. These surveys are focused on women, but for each mother
the survey includes height data for all children under the age of five. The number of
children under five in each survey round with their birth year is shown in Table 1.1.
The data for the second stage comes from the third round of the Tanzania Na-
tional Panel Survey conducted in 2012-2013 as part of the World Banks Living Stan-
dard Measurement Survey. The first round ran from October 2008 to September
2009 and the second round ran from October 2010 to September 2011. The original
sample included 3265 households separated in 409 enumeration areas. The second
round re-interviewed 97% of the original households (90% of individuals) and fol-
lowed split off households for a total sample of 3924 households. There are 3198
household represented in both surveys. The units of observation used here are indi-
viduals in the household. Except were explicitly noted, references to TNPS survey
will mean specifically the third round of data.
The TNPS section on anthropometrics was limited to individuals under 20 years
old. It includes each individuals weight, height and if they were measured while
standing or laying down. Given the requirement for the individual to be present
during the survey, and some peoples refusal to be measured, only 83% of individuals
in the study were measured. To calculate the HAZ score, each persons height is
compared to the 2006 WHO growth standards chart, if they are under 5, and to the
2007 WHO growth standards chart if they are ages 5-19. The score is based upon
height, age, gender and if they were measured while standing. Over the past 20
years, Tanzania has seen significant decreases in the extent of stunting. Between the
1990 DHS survey and the 2012-2013 survey, under-5 Height-For-Age Z-scores rose
from -1.99 to -1.4, an improvement of .59 standard deviations. This improvement
is substantial but the rate leaves much to be desired. At this rate of .03 standard
deviations a year, it will take 47 years for Tanzania under-5 population to match the
distribution of the non-nutritionally deprived chilren found from the WHO Standards
studies. The extent of stunting, defined as having a height for age score of -1 or below,
has on the other hand, been dropping rapidly in recent years. In the 2008-2009 LSMS
survey, 38% of Tanzanians under the age of twenty were stunted, and in the 2010-
2011 survey 33% of youths were stunted. By the 2012-2013 study this had fallen to
28%.
The surveys differed in what they recorded regarding household conditions and
assets. To create a common index valid across samples I used principle component
analysis to reduce the multiple variables into a single wealth index. This procedure is
widely used for DHS data and has been shown to be a consistent and valid estimator
of household social and economic status. To construct the wealth index I used vari-
ables for the number of rooms in the household, the material used for the roof, floors,
and ceilings, the source of water and type of latrine or toilet, and the households
ownership of a range of assets. To prevent differing units of scale from biasing the
results each variable was first converted into a z-score before calculating the index
from the first component. The index was then divided into five quintiles. Because
household size is correlated with wealth of the households the sample quintiles are
not evenly divided into 20 percent each.
1.5 The Empirical Model
I will first explain the concept behind the two sample two stage least squares
(TS2SLS) model, then derive the particular specification used to answer specific
questions. To understand the TS2SLS model, consider a case where we desire to
estimate the equation Y = Xβ + , where in our case X is childrens height for age
z-score along with various controls and Y is years of education achieved or another
variable of interest. For an OLS estimate to be unbiased, X would have to be uncorre-
lated with the error term . That is obviously not true. The numerous determinants
Table 1.1. Summary Statistics for DHS Suveys
Male Female All
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Height-Age Zscore -1.91 1.47 -1.73 1.43 -1.82 1.45
Hunger Season Birth 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.44 0.24 0.43
Rural 0.77 0.42 0.82 0.38 0.79 0.40
Female 0 0 1 0 0.49 0.50
Birth Order 3.88 2.57 3.88 2.58 3.88 2.58
Poor 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.18 0.39
Middle Class 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42
Richer 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39
Richest 0.15 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35
Mean and standard deviation of key variables from the DHS surveys.
Data is of children under the the age of five for which we have height
data.
of nutrition and health are also likely determinants of school achievement. To get at
the exogenous variation in X we need an instrument Z that is correlated with X but,
other than its impact on X, has no effect on Y.
Unfortunately we need both early age height for age scores and later age school
outcome, which are not combined in the sample survey. Instead, we can consider
two samples that include the instrument, endogenous, and control variables in the
first sample, but where the endogenous variable is unobserved in the second sample.
So we can consider a model where
X2 = Z2Π + η2
and
Table 1.2. Summary Statistics For TNPS 2012-2013 Survey
Male Female All
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Height-Age Zscore -1.55 1.13 -1.26 1.06 -1.39 1.10
Education 4.28 2.75 4.59 2.86 4.44 2.81
bmi 16.8 2.27 17.4 3.43 17.1 2.96
Hunger Season Birth 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43
Rural 0.71 0.45 0.69 0.46 0.70 0.46
Female 0 0 1 0 0.53 0.50
Birth Order 2.58 1.57 2.55 1.56 2.57 1.56
Poor 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.40
Middle Class 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.42
Richer 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.41
Richest 0.18 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39
Mean and standard deviation of key variables from the LSMS sur-
veys. Data is of children born between 1985-2005 to match the
sample from the DHS.
X1 = Z1Π + η1
but X2 is unobserved. Despite being unable to observe X2 we can still created a Xˆ2
of instrumented values of X2 by utilizing the first stage relationship:
Xˆ2 = Z2(Z
′
1Z1)
−1Z ′1X1
From this we can estimate the instrumented values of βˆts2sls via:
βˆts2sls = (Xˆ2
′
Xˆ2)
−1(Xˆ2
′
Y2)
This can be rearranged to the simpler form of
βˆts2sls = (Z
′
1X1/n1)
−1C(Z2Y2/n2)
where
C = (Z ′1Z1/n1)
−1(Z ′2Z2/n2)
This is the two sample 2SLS estimator from Inoue and Solon (2010).
A similar but different two stage IV estimator was presented in Angrist and
Krueger (1992) where βˆts2sls = (Z
′
1X1/n1)
−1(Z2Y2/n2). Unlike the single sample
case for TS2SLS, it is not equivalent to an IV estimator. The TS2SLS differs by
the inclusion of a C matrix. This matrix provides a correction for any difference
between the two samples. Important for this paper is that this correction maintains
consistency when samples differ in their sampling stratification.
To account for household fixed effects, all the variables are transformed in each
sample, taking out the household-specific means. Estimating the regression with the
transformed variables, removes any household heterogeneity from the estimation yet
maintains the standard TS2SLS framework. However, this procedure would require a
degree of freedom adjustment to calculate appropriate standard errors. Since proper
procedure for this where the degrees of freedom used differ in the two stages has not
been derived I utilized bootstrapped standard errors in all the TS2SLS models.
I will use this TS2SLS estimator to answer three questions.
First: What is the impact of congenital stunting on later height achieved? Do
children stunted by hunger season birth later experience catch-up growth and
ultimately match the height of their peers? Specifically I will estimate:
H2013 = β1 ∗ HˆU−5 + β2 ∗BirthY ear + β3 ∗BORD
+ β4 ∗ Female+
∑
γi ∗Wi + µj +  (1.1)
In this model HˆU−5 is the under-5 Height-for-Age Z-score as predicted from
the first stage regression with the hunger season birth variable included as an
instrument:
HˆU−5 = β1 ∗HS Birth+ β2 ∗BirthY ear + β3 ∗BORD+
β4 ∗ Female+
∑
γi ∗Wi + µj +  (1.2)
Where HS Birth is the percent of third trimester that overlapped with the
hunger season. The results of this first stage regression were presented in
the previous section in Table 1.3. The first stage estimation uses DHS surveys,
while the other variables in this equation are from the LSMS as explained in the
two stage model above. H2013 is the Height-for-Age Z-score of children under
the age of twenty as recorded in the 2012- 2013 LSMS survey. BirthY ear
and BORD are the childs birth year and order of birth relative to siblings
respectively. Wi is four dummy variables for each of wealth quantiles created
from the wealth index. µj are region level fixed effects. To create a household
fixed effects for each variable I took the deviation from the household mean as
described above. The two hypotheses I am interested in are:
1. H0 : β1 > 0 Do individuals stunted in utero maintain that stunting or
does it disappear over time?
2. H0 : β1 == 1 If the stunting does not completely disappear can we say
that some catch-up growth has occurred?
Second: What impact does childhood stunting have on later body mass index. Here
I am estimating:
BMI2013 = β1 ∗ HˆU−5 + β2 ∗BirthY ear + β3 ∗BORD
+ β4 ∗ Female+
∑
γi ∗Wi + µj +  (1.3)
Third: What impact does early childhood stunting have on the number of years of
schooling completed? The model is as before:
S = β1∗HˆU−5+β2∗BirthY ear+β3∗BORD+β4∗Female+
∑
γi ∗Wi+µj+
(1.4)
where S is number of years of schooling achieved and the rest of the variables
stay as specified above. The hypothesis I am testing here is if H0 : β1 > 0.
Note that the variable HˆU−5 is height and so the expected sign here is positive.
1.6 The Lean Season
The instrument of quarter of birth depends on the seasonal variation in access
to food. Moore et al. (1997); Lokshin and Radyakin (2012b); Moore et al. (2004);
Yamauchi (2012) have all previously explored the impacts of seasonal variations in
food availability on children. These studies, with the exception of Yamauchi (2012),
focus on higher levels of mortality later in life. In this section I will present some
evidence of the relationship between season of birth and health and educational
outcomes and presenting evidence of the validity of season of birth as an instrument
for stunting. In addition to arguing that season of birth provides a strong predictor
of stunting I will address potential threats to the validity of season of birth being
properly excludable.
1.6.1 Effect of Season of Birth on under-5 Stunting
Agriculture in Tanzania is shaped by two growing seasons: the masika, or long
rainy season where food is planted in the spring and harvested from July to early
September, and the vuli, or short rainy season with planting in October and Novem-
ber and harvesting in February. Prices for staples food tend to reach their lowest
point each August and then rise to a high point from November through January.
During these months, respondents to the LSMS survey are also most likely to say
they fear hunger.
In Figure 1.1 I present a local polynomial graph of the relationship between height
for age and month of birth from the LSMS. Those born in the first quarter, when
their late pregnancy would have overlapped with the hungry season, have a mean
height for age z-score of less than negative two. As the time between hunger season
and birth grows the average height also increases, reaching its peak after the harvest
in August. This pattern is consistent with the view that the in utero period is a
sensitive period and time spent in utero after a shock helps to compensate for the
earlier shock.
The first stage regressions are shown in Table 1.3 with both male and female
children, the genders separated and a household fixed effects model. Robust standard
errors clustered at the sampling cluster level are reported. In the difference of being
born with all of the third trimester overlapping with the hunger season compared
to there being no overlap is roughly .3 standard deviations. In all four models the
result is statistically significant at the p < .001 level.
This third trimester effect of the hunger season seems to affect individuals at
all levels of the society. As shown in Table 1.4, when these first stage regressions
are run for each wealth quintile separately the hunger season variable is statistically
significant in each one. However the effect is somewhat muted in the first and fifth
quintile-both the poorest and the richest-and highest in the middle quintiles. This
pattern is consistent with what we would expect from a seasonal hunger explanation.
The lowest quintile likely faces year around deprivation while the upper classes have
some ability to protect themselves from seasonal hunger. That the middle income
levels would have the highest seasonal variation is to be expected. That the upper
incomes levels are not able to completely protect their children from seasonal hunger
is not as surprising as it may first seem. Stunted birth weight has resulted from even
relatively minor nutritional deficiencies. For stunting to occur there need not be
absolute starvation but merely relative deprivation. For example, Scharber (2014)
found that periods of unemployment for mothers in Texas correlates with lower birth
weights.
1.7 Empirical Findings
In this section I present the results of models explained in Section 1.5. In all
the models here the standard errors reported are bootstrapped with clustering at
the sample cluster level. To replicate the two-sample survey the sampling for the
bootstrap was stratified by first and second stage sample, with the sample size in
each bootstrap set to its respective sample size. One thousand replications were used
in each model.
Figure 1.1. Height for Age Z Scores by Month of Birth
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Local polynomial estimate of height for age z-score. Data from DHS survey of children under the
age of five.
Table 1.3. Effects of Third Trimester in Hunger Season on Under-5 Height
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Females Only Males Only HH Fixed Effects
Hunger Season -0.302∗∗∗ -0.304∗∗∗ -0.294∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗∗
(0.0424) (0.0555) (0.0605) (0.0589)
Birth Year 0.0118∗∗ 0.0124∗ 0.0110∗ 0.0239∗∗
(0.00449) (0.00527) (0.00554) (0.00856)
Female 0.157∗∗∗ 0 0 0.188∗∗∗
(0.0249) (.) (.) (0.0321)
Birth Order -0.00239 -0.00370 -0.00184 0.0190
(0.00531) (0.00720) (0.00741) (0.0113)
Wealth Quantiles:
Poor 0.0781 0.145∗ 0.00586
(0.0452) (0.0581) (0.0604)
Middle Class 0.115∗ 0.180∗∗ 0.0469
(0.0478) (0.0610) (0.0599)
Richer 0.393∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗
(0.0528) (0.0605) (0.0708)
Richest 0.524∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗
(0.0549) (0.0639) (0.0769)
Constant -25.94∗∗ -27.06∗ -24.32∗ -0.116∗∗∗
(8.931) (10.48) (11.03) (0.00512)
Observations 15461 7703 7758 15688
Standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors are bootstrapped with clustering at sampling clus-
ter level. Fixed effects for each region is included in each regression but not reported. Wealth
quintiles were created by principle component analysis of household assets. Sample includes chil-
dren under five but over 1 at the time of survey from five rounds of DHS surveys from 2005 to
2007. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.4. First Stage Regression - Effects of Hunger Season Birth on Under-5
height - by Wealth Quintiles.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Height Height Height Height Height
(Poorest) (Poor) (Middle) (Richer) (Richest)
Hunger Season -0.234∗∗ -0.317∗∗ -0.353∗∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗ -0.209∗
(0.0803) (0.115) (0.0921) (0.0948) (0.106)
Birth Year -0.00688 -0.00426 0.0198∗∗ -0.0174∗ 0.0701∗∗∗
(0.00831) (0.00919) (0.00715) (0.00814) (0.00809)
Female 0.0623 0.208∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.147∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.0506) (0.0617) (0.0539) (0.0592) (0.0623)
Birth Order 0.00608 -0.00264 0.0197 -0.0208 -0.0190
(0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0117) (0.0150)
Constant 11.11 6.031 -41.80∗∗ 32.72∗ -141.6∗∗∗
(16.55) (18.35) (14.24) (16.21) (16.09)
Observations 4152 2584 3582 2913 2230
Standard errors in parentheses
Regional fixed effects included but not reported.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.5. Effects of Early Childhood stunting on later childhood stunting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Females Only Males Only HH Fixed Effects
Height-Age Zscore 0.646∗ 0.432 1.077 0.214
(0.256) (0.352) (0.559) (0.211)
Birth Year 0.00837 -0.0368∗∗∗ 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.00289
(0.00786) (0.0102) (0.0133) (0.00687)
Female 0.238∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗
(0.0618) (0.0563)
Birth Order -0.0218 -0.0191 -0.0132 -0.0274
(0.0157) (0.0195) (0.0201) (0.0159)
Wealth Quantiles:
Poor -0.0375 -0.153 0.105
(0.0824) (0.103) (0.128)
Middle Class 0.174∗ 0.121 0.226
(0.0815) (0.114) (0.128)
Richer 0.171 0.148 0.105
(0.143) (0.208) (0.261)
Richest 0.493∗∗ 0.494 0.430
(0.169) (0.257) (0.265)
Constant -17.22 72.93∗∗∗ -121.3∗∗∗ -0.0448
(15.99) (20.74) (27.16) (0.0247)
KP F-Stat 52.99∗∗∗ 27.14∗∗∗ 28.51∗∗∗ 29.83∗∗∗
(8.014) (5.327) (6.405) (5.216)
Observations 23577 11839 11738 23804
Standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors are bootstrapped with clustering at sampling
cluster level and stratified by first stage and second stage samples. Fixed effects for each region is
included in each regression but not reported. Wealth quintiles were created by principle component
analysis of household assets. First stage sample included children under five but over 1 at the time
of survey from five rounds of DHS surveys from 2005 to 2007. Second stage sample comes from
the 2012-2013 Living Standards Measurement Survey of individuals born from 1985 to 2007. ∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.6. Effects of Sibling’s Hunger Season Birth on height, BMI and Education
Height Height Height Height
Hunger Season Birth For:
Individual -0.236∗∗ -0.253∗∗ -0.146 -0.142
(0.0873) (0.0963) (0.109) (0.131)
Other Siblings -0.00317
(0.125)
Older Siblings 0.0379 -0.0813
(0.133) (0.191)
Younger Siblings -0.148 -0.0702
(0.132) (0.157)
Observations 1574 1286 887 616
BMI BMI BMI BMI
Individual 0.356∗ 0.311 0.366∗ 0.212
(0.144) (0.162) (0.170) (0.206)
Other Siblings -0.337
(0.209)
Older Siblings -0.0416 -0.0804
(0.212) (0.290)
Younger Siblings -0.393 -0.427
(0.204) (0.243)
Observations 2155 1449 1438 755
Education Education Education Education
Individual -0.396∗∗∗ -0.545∗∗∗ -0.263 -0.479∗∗
(0.114) (0.125) (0.144) (0.182)
Other Siblings -0.0275
(0.179)
Older Siblings -0.153 -0.114
(0.179) (0.256)
Younger Siblings 0.0411 0.226
(0.181) (0.214)
Observations 3152 2012 2200 1089
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Robust standard errors clustered at the sample
cluster level reported in parenthesis. Controls included but not reported are dummies of
female, birth order and rural household; a birth year trend, wealth index quintiles and
regional fixed effects.
Table 1.7. Two-Sample 2SLS Estimates Congenital Stunting on Years of Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Females Only Males Only HH Fixed Effects
Height-Age Zscore 1.183∗∗∗ 1.504∗∗ 0.927 0.878∗
(0.343) (0.526) (0.532) (0.404)
Birth Year 0.300∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗
(0.00989) (0.0136) (0.0126) (0.0142)
Female -0.0765 -0.0368
(0.0863) (0.0972)
Birth Order 0.0406∗ 0.0970∗∗∗ -0.0260 0.0119
(0.0199) (0.0277) (0.0281) (0.0280)
Wealth Quantiles:
Poor 0.443∗∗∗ 0.178 0.649∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.168) (0.160)
Middle Class 0.812∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗ 1.018∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.177) (0.155)
Richer 1.352∗∗∗ 1.035∗∗∗ 1.639∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.265) (0.256)
Richest 1.979∗∗∗ 1.468∗∗∗ 2.426∗∗∗
(0.225) (0.367) (0.298)
Constant -599.6∗∗∗ -659.6∗∗∗ -530.7∗∗∗ 0.0360
(20.13) (27.91) (25.78) (0.0465)
KP F-Stat 52.99∗∗∗ 27.14∗∗∗ 28.51∗∗∗ 29.83∗∗∗
(8.395) (5.841) (6.004) (5.671)
Observations 23577 11839 11738 23804
Standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors are bootstrapped with clustering at sampling
cluster level and stratified by first stage and second stage samples. Fixed effects for each region is
included in each regression but not reported. Wealth quintiles were created by principle component
analysis of household assets. First stage sample included children under five but over 1 at the time
of survey from five rounds of DHS surveys from 2005 to 2007. Second stage sample comes from
the 2012-2013 Living Standards Measurement Survey of individuals born from 1985 to 2007. ∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
1.7.1 Effect of early childhood stunting on stunting and BMI later in life
In Table 1.5 the results from the TS2SLS estimates on effect of early childhood
stunting on later stunting are presented. They show interesting differences between
the non-fixed effects model, male- and female-only models, and the household fixed
effects model. In the model without household fixed effects (Model 1), 65% of the
childhood stunting is maintained. Looking at the female- and male-only models, it
appears that the gains are entirely attributable to female children, who maintain
only 43% of their stunting, while for males the later stunting is 1.08 times the earlier
stunting. It should be noted, however, that for models such as these, with only
half the sample, the standard errors are large and not significantly different from
each other or zero. It has been previously hypothesized that females in Tanzania
suffer fewer effects of food deprivation because the higher levels of indoor and food
preparation work give them greater access to food.
More interesting are the results in the household fixed effects model. The estimate
of .21 is both much smaller than the non-household fixed effects model and is not
significantly different then zero. In other words, with the inclusion of the household
fixed effects there is no evidence stunting is preserved into later years. Since the first
stage of the household fixed effects model was essentially identical to the non-fixed
effects first stage; this result is not driven by different first stage results. So when
some siblings are born in the hunger season and some are not there is a difference
of under-5 stature; however, this difference dissipates to statistical non-significance
over time. But when two children from different families are born in different seasons
there is less collapsing of the difference over time.
We see similar differences between the models with and without household fixed
effects when examining body mass index. In the model without household fixed
effects there was no relationship (coefficient of -.038 and standard error of .47). But
in the household fixed effects model, a one standard deviation in stunting is correlated
with an 1.8 unit increase in the body mass index (with standard error of .85). This
is consistent with the idea that unobserved household heterogeneity correlates with
households with more hunger season births to lower availability of food or other
determinants of health.
Another possible interpretation of this is that there might be spillover effects
between siblings. The presence of a non-hunger season born child in the same house-
hold as a hunger season born child would make the stunting of the latter child more
apparent, and quite possibly induce the parents to initiate compensatory food pro-
vision.
The question of if parents engage in compensatory or reinforcing behavior is
related to but distinct from the question of if there are spillover effects on siblings.
To review, compensatory investments is when investments increase in response to
shock ( δIt+1
δµ
> 0) and reinforcing investment is when it fall in response to a negative
shock ( δIt+1
δµ
< 0). These are comparing the investments in single comparison to the
hypothetical case where their exposure differed. These compensating or reinforcing
investment patterns become spillovers when they affect the investment made in a
sibling. A spillover effect would be
δIt+1,i
δµj
6= 0 where j is any child in the family other
then i.
If spillover effects exist they would bias the results of the household fixed effects
models. Luckily we can test for spillover effects directly. To do this we use the second
stage data and set up a the reduced form model but include in addition a variable
of the average third trimester exposure of siblings:
Y = β1 ∗HS Birthi + β2 ∗HS Birthj + β3 ∗BirthY ear + β4 ∗BORD
+ β5 ∗ Female+
∑
γi ∗Wi + µj + 
In this model HS Birthj is the average third trimester exposure to siblings. I
include variation where j is limited to only older or only younger siblings. For the
dependent variable Y I consider all three of my key dependent variables, height for
age in 2013 survey, BMI, and education achievement. The results from this test for
the hunger season exposure variables are shown in Table 1.6. In all specifications
the effects of siblings exposure are statistically insignificant. There is no evidence of
spillover effects between siblings.
I will show in Section 1.8.2 that, over time, upper income households have be-
come less likely to have children born during the hunger season; hence, low income
households are overrepresented among those stunted from the hunger season. Some
similar unobserved heterogeneity could be driving the differences between the models
with fixed effects and those without. Although compensating investments are still a
possible explanation the finding that siblings exposure has no effect assure us that
the differences are not driven by decreases in siblings height. Whether driven by
household heterogeneity or compensating investments the results are indicative that
when a stunted child is given adequate resources they are able to make early stunting
dissipate with catch-up growth.
1.7.2 Effects of early childhood Stunting on Educational Outcomes.
The results of the TS2SLS estimates on the effects of congenital stunting on
educational outcomes are presented in Table 1.7. In the full-sample non-household
fixed effects model (Model 1) a one standard deviation in increase in early childhood
increases the years of schooling achieved by 1.183 years. This result is significant at
the p < 0.001 level. The household fixed effects model (Model 4) shows that a one
standard deviation increase in childhood height relative to siblings increases years
of school attained by .898 years. This is significant at the p < .05 level. So even if,
among siblings, stunted children are able to reduce the height difference, there still
remain statistically and socially significant differences in years of education achieved.
In the female and male models (Models 2 & 3, respectively) the female’s education
decreases by 1.5 years for a 1 standard deviation stunting (p < .01) while for boys
there is a non-significant decrease of .93 years of schooling for one standard deviation
unit of childhood stunting. While keeping in mind that these are not statistically
significant differences, we might note the differences between these results and the
previous section on the extent of catch-up growth. Assuming the results are not just
driven by sampling error, females seem to recover from the physical effects of early
childhood stunting better than their male counterparts, but suffer worse effects in the
extent of school achieved. It is possible that while females have more access to food
to compensate for early stunting, there might be more of a reinforcing investment
pattern for female educational investments.
In the next section I will discuss evidence of household heterogeneity in the timing
of births. This would bias the models without household fixed effects. On the other
hand there is not evidence of spillover effects on siblings. Because of these reason he
household fixed effects model is the preferred model. The result that a one standard
deviation difference in stunting causes a .898 years difference in education needs to
be put in perspective. Using the 2012-2013 LSMS survey we find that adults over the
age of 16 have on average 7.9 years of education. A .898 year difference in education
is equivalent to 11% of the average adult level of education. Between the 1990 DHS
survey and the 2012-2013 survey, under-5 Height-For-Age Z-scores rose from -1.99
to -1.4, an improvement of .59 standard deviations. This improvement over time
implies that, due to their superior nutritional status, children born in the period of
2005-2010 will likely complete .52 more years of school, a 6.6% difference, compared
to children born from 1985-1990. If this upward trend were to continue to where
the mean child in Tanzania was the same stature of the non-nutritionally deficient
children in the WHO Standards, the gains from nutrition would cause 21% in the
overall average educational achievement in Tanzanian adults.
1.8 Possible Sources of Bias
I consider two additional threats to identification that might bias the results
above. They are 1) sample selection due to selective mortality and 2) month of birth
be correlated with determinants of health and schooling.
1.8.1 Sample Selection
The DHS survey include a complete birth history for every woman in the survey.
The birth history includes the month of birth of all children, even those that have
passed away. From this data we are able to calculate the infant mortality rate by
season of birth. Of children born during the hunger season 10.5% have passed away
by their fifth birthday. In comparison for those born outside the hunger season there
is a 9.2% under-5 mortality rate. This difference is significant at the p < .01 level.
A simple method for considering the possible range of the selection effect is to
use a trimming procedure (Lee, 2009). The essential concept of is to take the portion
of sample that is missing data due to mortality and to take the distribution of an
equivalent proportion of the non-missing sample at both the top and bottom of the
distribution. Using this we can calculate the counter-factual case if the children
from the additional mortality had survived and were either among the tallest or the
shortest and get the ultimate potential bounds of the bias.
The standard assumption in the literature on height and selection is that health
can be conceived as a latent variable which is observed as height if above some level
and death if below that level. If this is the case then the lower bound is likely to be
correct. On the other hand there is the potential that naturally shorter people might
be better suit for conserving energy and hence might survive deprivation better. In
this case the bias would be in the direction of the upper bound.
In a t-test of the difference in height by the binary hungry season birth indicator
(if the birth is in January, February, or March, the three months with the most third
trimester overlap with the hunger season) find a statistically significant difference
in Height-for-Age for hunger season birth by -.18 standard deviations. Using Lee’s
(2009) trimming to create upper and lower bounds for changes in mortality might
have effected this outcome we find an upper bounds of -.12 and lower bound of -.25.
The upper bound maintains a statistically significant difference from zero. So even in
the unlikely case that additional mortality came exclusively from the tallest portion
of the population the hunger season births would still be significantly shorter than
non-hunger season births. The lower bound, which accords to the more generally
accepted latent variable concept of health, shows that mortality might be shaving
up to .07 standard deviations from the seasonal differences.
Unfortunately given the second stage sample incomplete information on mortality
we can not conduct a similar exercise to determine the potential effects on education
outcomes. A more vital question is what is the possible impact on our two-sample
2SLS estimates of the impact of early child hood stunting on later stature and later
educator outcomes. Consider two families that are identical on observed characteris-
tics but one family scores lower in some unobserved vector Q of qualities that helped
children recover from shocks. We would expect from this that the family with lower
Q would both have higher mortality and a higher response to shocks. If this is the
case the results would be biased downward.
1.8.2 Month of Birth
For the season of birth to be a valid instrument it needs to be uncorrelated with
other determinants of educational outcomes. This is likely to be the case if when the
child is born is essentially random. However it is quite possible that this is not the
case. It could be that the agricultural season or migrant work season effect times
of conception. Or they could be correlated with religious holidays. There might
be different seasonal differences for younger or first time parents due to wedding or
school seasons.
Another possible bias is if the timing of children’s birth are not randomly dis-
tributed by correlated to other household characteristics. If this is the case it would
bias the models without household fixed effects. To check for this I conducted mul-
tiple t-tests and linear probability model (LPM) tests of the DHS sample to search
for possible trends in season of birth. None were found when the data was limited to
the birth years I use for my regression: 1985 - 2005. Using a binary indicator for if
the child was born in the three months (January, February, March) that would have
the most third trimester over lap with hunger season I tested if any wealth quintile’s
proportion of hunger seasons births differed from the 1/4 proportion expected from
random distribution. None did. Nor did any wealth quintile proportion of hunger
season birth differ from the other quintiles. Using a LPM with controls for region,
birth year, birth order the wealth quintiles still had no relationship. These results
were robust to both including and excluding children who had passed away of lim-
iting to first born or not first born. Similar t-tests and LPM found no relationship
between being first born and a hunger season birth.
To check the robustness of this I repeated the exercise including in the sample
people who fell outside birth years I include in my sample. Including people born
before 1985 had no effect on the results. However including children born after the
2005 cut off induced substantial changes however. With these children included all
quintiles of wealth except for the lowest saw a decrease in portions of births born
during the hunger season. For the second to fifth quintile portion of births during the
hunger season fell to 20%. With this change the lowest quintile now has a statistically
significant higher portion of births in the hunger season. A possible explanation is
that increased access to birth control is allowing families to plan pregnancies to
avoid the hunger season. In 1992 Tanzania initiated a National Population Policy
that called for universal access to modern contraceptives. From 1996 to 2004 the use
of modern contraceptives increased from 18.4% to 26 percent.
Limiting the sample to before 2006 and then iteratively adding prior years I tested
for each of upper four wealth quintiles when its proportion of hunger season birth
became statistically different than 1/4. For the second and fourth quintile only the
2005 birth set by itself was significant, for the third quintile everything after 1994
was significant and for richest quintile everything after 1996 was significant. Despite
these trends in the third and fifth quintiles iteratively adding years prior to 2005
was unable to find any subset of years in the sample where the poorest quintile was
statistically significantly different than the other quintiles.
To summarize the above there appears to be in the second half my sample (those
born after the mid 1990’s) a lower portion of babies born during the hunger season
for all but the poorest households. While the trends on observed characteristics can
controlled for there is still the possibility that these trends are correlated with non-
observed differences. Because of this, the models estimated without household fixed
effects should be considered with skepticism and I report the household fixed effect
models to be the preferred ones.
1.8.3 Relationship between Hunger Season and Later School Outcomes
A possible bias to my results could arise if season of birth influence educational
achievement by means other than in-utero nutrition. Here we will look more closely
at the relationship between birthdate and education and consider other possible
pathways. Most notably there could be a relationship between the third trimester
overlap and being born after the start of the school year. I will argue that the likely
effect if any of a school year effect would be to create a small positive effect for those
with third trimester exposure on education. This would have an effect of biasing my
results downward. In the section that follows I will attempt to confirm this analysis
using a falsification test from regions without seasonal hunger.
Figure 1.2 shows the relationship between the age when a child begins school and
their month of birth. Most interesting about this graph is that there is not a linear
trend across the year but instead almost a perfect mirror image of the distribution of
height in Figure 1.1. Those born in the first quarter, when the third trimester would
have overlapped with the hunger season, start the latest. This fact is important,
as one potential source of bias could be if the timing of the start of the school year
drove early in year births to start school at younger age. There is some evidence that
starting younger, when children are not as emotionally or mentally prepared for the
challenges of school, leads to worse school outcomes. The later starting age for hunger
season births indicates that this is not driving the results here and might, in fact, be
muting the actual effects. These results could be the outcome of parents subjectively
trying to decide when their children are ready and thus holding congenitally stunted
children back a year. Again, one interesting observation is that the children born
following the harvest in August start the earliest.
Conversely we can consider the opposite side of potential start of the school year
effects. Angrist and Krueger (1992) consider the effects of the month of birth as
driving total school achievement in the U.S. by assuming a certain percent will drop
out once achieving the legal age to do so. For this population, those born in months
where they would start at later age would achieve less education then those born in
other months. The institutional context here is important: the results in the U.S.
are driven by compulsory education being limited to a specific age range. Although
the 1978 Tanzania law stated that [i]t shall be compulsory for every child who has
attained the age of seven years but has not attained the age of thirteen years to
be enrolled for primary education, a 1995 amendment rephrased the requirement to
[i]t shall be compulsory for every child who has reached the age of seven years to
be enrolled for primary education. With this change, the number of complete years
of school replaced age as determining the end of compulsory education. Since my
regression reported later will be limited to children born after 1985, none would have
reached the 13 year cut off of the 1978 law prior to it being amended. Hence, the
law that would apply to children in my sample would require achieving seven years
of education regardless of the age at which they started school.
If, somehow, there was still some start of school year effect that was driving the
results we would expect the children born in months that start school later to either
leave school at a parallel later age or for there to be no season difference between
season of birth and age leaving school. In Figure 1.3 I present the age leaving school
by month of birth for those born since independence (1963) and who are of at least
15 years of age. Instead of the pattern we would expect from a timing of the start
of the school year we see that those starting later (those born in the first quarter)
leave at a younger age, while those starting earlier (those born after the harvest)
leave school at a later age.
Using the same sample as in Figure 1.3 we can look at the percent that attempt to
take the Primary School Leaving Exam, necessary to go on to secondary education.
In Figure 1.4 we see that those born at the start of the year are less likely to attempt
the test, with the probability of taking the test rising for those born after the harvest.
To summarize this section: children born when the third trimester overlaps with the
hunger season have lower height for age z-scores, they start school at an older age,
they leave school at an older age and they are less likely to take the PSLE test to go
on to secondary school.
1.8.4 Falsification Test with Zanzibar and Coastal Urban Areas.
In the previous section I presented evidence that overlap between the third
trimester of pregnancy and the hunger season is correlated with under-5 stunting.
Additionally, I presented arguments that this stunting determines later educational
outcomes and that any relationship between season of birth and the school year was
likely to bias the estimates towards underestimating the relationship. Here I will
provide a more formal falsification test of this argument. If the relationship with
school year was driving the results this relationship should be found in all areas of
the country regardless of if there was a strong hunger season stunting effect or not.
If we find evidence of a season of birth effect on education in areas that do not have
Figure 1.2. Age of Starting School by Month of Birth
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Figure 1.3. Age of Leaving School by Month of Birth
16
.5
17
17
.5
Ag
e 
of
 L
ea
vin
g 
Sc
ho
ol
Jan April Aug. Dec
Hunger Season Harvest
95% CI Age Leaving School
Sample: LSMS Survey Born After 1963
Local Polynomial: Age of Leaving School by Month of Birth
Local polynomial estimate of age of leaving school by month of birth. Data from LSMS, limited to
people born since Tanzanian Independence in 1963 and who have left school.
Figure 1.4. Percent taking PSLE by Month of Birth
.8
6
.8
8
.9
.9
2
Pe
rc
en
t t
ha
t t
oo
k P
SL
E 
Ex
am
Jan April Aug. Dec
Hunger Season Harvest
95% CI Percent taking PSLE
Sample: LSMS Survey Born After 1963 & Older then 15
Local Polynomial: Percent taking PSLE by Month of Birth
Local polynomial estimate of age of start school by month of birth. Data from LSMS, limited to
people born since Tanzanian Independence in 1963 and over age of 15.
a season of birth effect on stunting this falsify my assumption. On the other hand,
finding no effects on education there would provide evidence that the relationship is
purely nutritional.
Two potential candidate regions are Zanzibar and the coastal urban areas. Zanz-
ibar is a chain of islands that were united with the mainland in 1964. Although
agriculture still makes up over a third of the regions domestic product compared
to the mainland, the agricultural product tends to be export oriented. Fishing and
tourism play a large role in the economy. The coastal urban areas share with Zanz-
ibar a traditional diet that differs from the interior of the country both due to the
presence of fish and the history of Arab colonization. Anthropologists have cate-
gorized distinct “traditional-coastal” and “traditional-inland” diets (Keding 2011).
Keding et al. note that the coastal diet is “characterized by fruits, nuts, starchy
plants, and fishcharacterized by fruits, nuts, starchy plants, and fish” as opposed to
the inland diet of “cereals, oils and fats, and vegetables.” Due to a lower reliance on
subsistence agriculture and foods effect by the seasonal rainfall it is expected that the
hunger seasonal would have a muted or nonexistent pattern in Zanzibar and coastal
urban areas. A third possible area is Kagera, next to Lake Victoria, which is known
(PrinciplesOfMedicineInAfrica:2004, 2004) as having lower seasonal hunger due to
fishing.
To test the appropriateness of the excludability of season of birth I provide here
the results of first stage and reduced form regressions for three regions of interior
Tanzania (where we expect to find a hunger season effect) and the coastal urban and
Zanzibar regions (where we do not expect to find a hunger season effect). Due to
the small sample, I do not include separate estimates for Kagera. For both the first
stage and second stage models I present the household fixed effects model. As above,
the first stage regression on the effect of season of birth on height is taken from DHS
data of children under the age of five. The reduced form regression of the effect of
season of birth on education uses data from the LSMS surveys. In both regressions
the samples are limited to the years 1985 to 2005.
The first stage is in the form of
HU−5 = β1 ∗HS Birth+ β2 ∗BirthY ear + β3 ∗BORD + β4 ∗ Female+ αH + 
and the reduced form regression is:
S = β1 ∗HS Birth+ β2 ∗BirthY ear + β3 ∗BORD + β4 ∗ Female+ αH + 
where α is the household fixed effects.
The results of these tests are shown in Table 1.8. The first stage regressions
show the expected patterns with a strong hunger season birth effect in the interior of
Tanzania but with a muted and statistically insignificant effect in Zanzibar and no
effect in coastal urban areas. The reduced form regression also follow this pattern; a
strong statistically significant effect of the hunger season on education in the interior
but statistically insignificant effects in the coastal urban and Zanzibar areas. Looking
at the coefficients for the interior and Zanzibar it is interesting to note that they
moved in parallel with an almost 1-to-1 relationship between stunting and fewer years
of education. Although the difference are very small and statistically insignificant
we do not see this almost 1-to-1 relationship between stunting and education in the
coastal urban areas. This could be due to small sample size and random sample
selection. Alternatively this could be the result of in migration to urban areas.
Luckily the LSMS data used in the reduced form includes information on whether
the subjects moved from another region, and from where they moved.
In Table 1.9 I present the results of separating the population of the coastal urban
areas into the those natively born in the area and those who migrated to the area.
The coefficient for those born in the area is now small and statistically insignificant,
but positive like the first stage regression. Using a one tail test of if the native coastal
urban hunger season effect is smaller than the that for the interior of Tanzania we
find it is significant at the 5% level. In column 4 we see that the school achievement
of those who migrated into coastal urban areas is similar to the those who were born
and remained in the interior. While the small sample sizes makes it impossible for
us to be sure that these relationships are not driven by random sample selection
they do support the argument that the results are driven by nutrition and congenital
stunting.
To solve the issue of low sample sizes we can expand the sample to include those
born before 1985. In Table 1.10, I separate out three samples; those born in areas
without seasonal hunger; those born in areas in which we have not found evidence of
seasonal hunger; and those born in areas of seasonal hunger currently living in areas
without seasonal hunger. Areas without seasonal hunger are defined as being coastal
urban areas, Zanzibar, and Kagera. All other regions are included in estimates
of areas with seasonal hunger. The table also reports the results of across model
tests of the equivalence of the hunger season coefficients. The coefficient on hunger
season for those born in areas without seasonal hunger is positive with a statistically
insignificant difference from zero. There is no effect for those who did not experience
seasonal in-utero nutritional constraints. This non-effect is statistically significantly
different from both those born and living in areas with seasonal hunger and from
those living with them in the non-seasonal hunger areas but having migrated from
areas of seasonal hunger.
These results show that there is an effect of the hunger season on education
only on people born in areas where the seasonal hunger pattern exists. For those
who migrate from areas with seasonal hunger to areas without the result show a
relationship between education and season of birth that resembles that of their birth
region and not their adopted region. Altogether these tests provide strong evidence
that the relationship between season of birth and educational outcomes is driven
solely by in-utero nutritional constraints.
1.9 Conclusion
There are three important implications of the findings presented in this paper.
First, consistent with a small but growing body of literature, I find in-utero environ-
ments matter, and economic shocks affect this environment. This can have lasting
impact, both biological and economic. Second, the good news is that congenital
stunting seems to be responsive to investments, as only 2/3 of the stunting seems
to persist (even less when comparisons are made within households). Moreover, this
catch-up does not seem to come with a penalty for other siblings there is no clear
Table 1.8. Effects between Siblings on Hunger Season Birth between Siblings on
Height & Education in Interior Tanzania, Zanzibar & Coastal Urban Areas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tanzania Interior Zanzibar Coastal Urban
Height Education Height Education Height Education
Hunger Season -0.305∗∗∗ -0.332∗∗ -0.118 -0.101 0.0283 -0.0761
(0.0595) (0.107) (0.213) (0.283) (0.238) (0.184)
Birth Year 0.0220∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.0350 0.169∗∗∗
(0.00874) (0.00487) (0.0331) (0.0133) (0.0222) (0.00895)
Birth Order 0.0172 -0.114∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.0177 0.0596 0.122
(0.0115) (0.0266) (0.0491) (0.0678) (0.0473) (0.0672)
Female 0.194∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗ 0.221∗ 0.303∗ 0.0395 -0.260
(0.0327) (0.0679) (0.0905) (0.126) (0.157) (0.135)
Constant -0.120∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -0.0857∗∗∗ -0.174 -0.0541∗ -0.493∗∗∗
(0.00551) (0.0335) (0.0144) (0.0987) (0.0227) (0.0710)
Observations 13918 5758 996 878 774 1469
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Robust standard errors clustered at the sample
cluster level reported in parenthesis. Sample limited to those born between 1985 and
2005. Household fixed effects used in all models reported here.
Table 1.9. Effects between Siblings on Hunger Season Birth on Education in Interior
Tanzania, Zanzibar & Coastal Urban Areas
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tanzania Interior Coastal Urban
All Native Born Migrant
Education Education Education Education
Hunger Season -0.332∗∗ -0.0761 0.105 -0.271
(0.107) (0.184) (0.212) (0.344)
Birth Year 0.178∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.00487) (0.00895) (0.0129) (0.0130)
Birth Order -0.114∗∗∗ 0.122 0.0403 0.202
(0.0266) (0.0672) (0.0806) (0.115)
Female 0.197∗∗ -0.260 -0.167 -0.312
(0.0679) (0.135) (0.184) (0.171)
Constant -0.287∗∗∗ -0.493∗∗∗ -0.346∗∗ -0.548∗∗∗
(0.0335) (0.0710) (0.119) (0.101)
Observations 5758 1469 784 729
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Robust standard errors clustered
at the sample cluster level reported in parenthesis. Sample comes from
second stage data from the LSMS surveys of those born between 1985 and
2005. Household fixed effects used in all models reported here.
Table 1.10. Effects between Siblings on Hunger Season Birth on Education by
Region of Birth, Expanded Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Born in Areas Born in Areas Migrated From Areas
Without Seasonal Hunger With Seasonal Hunger With Seasonal Hunger
Education Education Education
Hunger Season 0.137 -0.294∗∗ -0.488
(0.155) (0.106) (0.285)
Birth Year 0.122∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.0920∗∗∗
(0.00522) (0.00298) (0.00809)
Female -0.179 -0.300∗∗∗ -0.917∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.0585) (0.132)
Birth Order 0.0380 -0.0237 0.233∗∗
(0.0566) (0.0280) (0.0876)
Constant -0.0417 -0.0657∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗
(0.0294) (0.0111) (0.0345)
Observations 2930 9198 1523
Test of if Hunger Season Coefficient Differnt From Areas without Seasonal Hunger:
Chi-Sq. 5.171 3.852
P-Value 0.0230 0.0497
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Robust standard errors clustered at the sample cluster
level reported in parenthesis. Sample comes from second stage data from the LSMS surveys
and is limited to those born before 2006 but includes those born before 1985. Household
fixed effects used in all models reported here.
negative spillover on sibling health or education. Third, the bad news is that the
physical catch up does not erase losses in skill formation. Instead, these shocks ap-
pear to leave a permanent mark via reduced school attainment, and hence likely on
economic and social opportunities.
Additionally, these results suggest that nutritional security could have a signif-
icant impact on macroeconomic outcomes. The results from the more conservative
estimates from the comparison of siblings imply that the decreases in under-5 stunt-
ing that occurred between 1990 and 2010 will result in 6.6% increase in years of
education for the Tanzanian children. If this trend were to continue to where the
mean child in Tanzania was the same height as the mean child raised without nutri-
tional constraints, they would on average complete 1.22 more years of schooling, a
15% increase. If the human capital argument that education increases productivity
is correct these nutritional gains could have a significant impact on growth.
This persistent effect could reflect a permanent negative effect of the in-utero
shock upon cognitive development. Or it could be that the cognitive effect is re-
versible, but too little (or not appropriate) investment is provided to reverse it.
Future research will be important to discern these channels which have important
policy implications.
CHAPTER 2
EFFECTS OF THE 2007-2008 FOOD PRICE SPIKES ON
IN-UTERO AND EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT
2.1 Introduction
Throughout 2007 and the first two quarters of 2008 the world saw rapid increases
in the prices of food. During these 18 months, the FAO’s world food price index
rose 60% with an even higher increase for the main staple foods such as maize
(Arndt et al., 2012b). For much or the world’s poor who are net consumers of
food products, the price increases decreased their ability to afford food and other
necessities. Researchers following the effects of the crisis have found negative effect
on the food crisis on the height of the young. This paper adds to this research by
studying how the effects differ according to the age of the child.
In this study, I use the 2007-2008 food price crisis impacts on four sub-Saharan
African countries - Ethiopia, Malawi, Uganda, and Tanzania - to examine the im-
pact on the children’s development from pre-conception to early childhood. There
are three goals of this study. The first goal is to discover the impact that the food
price crisis had on children’s development. As government stockpiles of food stores
has decreased over the past two decades, and expectations of increased variation in
harvest driven by a changing climate, understanding the potential impact of move-
ments in staple food prices becomes more critical. The second goal is to identify
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differences in sensitivity of children’s development to a shock at different stages of
development. Greater understanding of how and when a shock affects development
can help guide future event studies examining in-utero shocks. The third goal is to
review how the food price shocks differed in their impacts across the four countries.
Looking at the heterogeneity of the country experiences can help guide research in
countries can protect their population from future food prices crises.
Exisiting research has found that crisis had negative effects in sub-Saharan African
countries despite high portions of the population being involved in agriculture. For
example, Anr´ıquez et al. (2013) find “food price spikes not only reduce the mean
consumption of dietary energy but also worsen the distribution of food calories, fur-
ther deteriorating the nutritional status of populations.” In a study of children in
Mozambique Arndt et al. (2012a) note that “the prevalence of underweight amongst
children rises in response to a higher inflation rate for basic food products. The very
high food inflation during 2008/09 was responsible for an extra 39,000 moderately
underweight and 24,000 severely underweight children.” Brinkman et al. (2010) note
“that energy consumption declined during 2006-2010 in nearly all developing regions,
resulting potentially in an additional 457 million people (of 4.5 billion) at risk of be-
ing hungry and many more unable to afford the dietary quality required to perform,
develop, and grow well.” Brinkman et al. (2010) also note that nutritional diversity
can fall as family cope by substituting their diet to the cheapest per calorie foods and
resulting in “increased odds of child stunting and chronic energy deficiency among
mothers.” Cornia et al. (2012) also find that in Malawi child visits to feeding centers
tripled during the crisis.
Darnton-Hill and Cogill (2010); Brinkman et al. (2010); Kumar and Quisumbing
(2013) all note that nutritional deficiency from the spike tend to hit hardest on
women and children, and that pregnant women and infants are especially vulnerable.
This vulnerability can have long term implications as a growing body of research is
finding that in-utero and early childhood development is a sensitive period which can
effect life outcomes (Gluckman and Hanson, 2004; Almond and Mazumder, 2013). A
key indicator used to identify if a population of children has had their development
stunted is their height, measure in height-for-age zscores, as compared to the 2006
WHO child growth standards. This indicator taken on greater importance in recent
years as research has shown that maldevelopment in height due to deprivations is
an indicator of maldevelopment of cognitive and noncognitive capabilities (Niehaus
et al., 2002; Alderman et al., 2006b; Dillingham and Guerrant, 2004). In addition
to the immediate toll on human welfare we now know that the deprivations of a
shock such as food price crisis can inhibit the development of the children’s human
capabilities and hence their life outcomes.
2.2 The Data
The data for this research comes from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)
and Living Standard and Measurement Surveys (LSMS). Both DHS and LSMS sur-
veys have large nationally representative samples and include for every household
in the survey the height of every child under the age of five. Since the height data
is limited to children under five only surveys taken with-in five years of the crisis
are included. That a country had both a Living Standard Measurement Survey and
Demographic and Health Survey taken within five years after the 2007-2008 food
price crisis was the criteria used to determine inclusion of the country in study. This
criteria was driven by the need to separate out the effect of the food price shock
on a birth cohort of children from the effect of their age at the time of the survey.
This requirement is necessary as age-at-the time of survey can be correlated with a
child’s height-for-age Z-score, and to separate out the effects of environment in which
cohort was born from this timing artifact it is necessary to have measurements at
multiple ages for each cohort. In Section 2.3, I will lay out the strategy for utilizing
the multiple studies for controlling this timing artifact.
From these requirements, there were five candidate countries: Ethiopia, Malawi,
Uganda, Tanzania, and Nigeria. The last one, Nigeria, was excluded from the study,
as a lack of information on age at the time of the survey made calculating the
children’s height-for-age z-score impossible. Excluding Nigeria left the study with
four countries: Ethiopia, Malawi, Uganda, and Tanzania. Ethiopia and Malawi each
had two Living Standard Measurement Surveys that covered the period of interest.
Tanzania and Uganda had three. In each survey height was measured for children
under five years of age. Key variables selected from these surveys were the height
and age in months for the children, their dates of birth, whether they lived in a rural
or urban area, gender, region of the country, and whether they were the first child
of the mother. A wealth index was calculated for each household using principle
component analysis on a variety of assets listed in the surveys. From the height
and age of the children, each child’s height-for-age z-score relative to the 2006 WHO
growth standards survey was calculated.
Table 2.1. Food Price Data
Country Crop % of Calories Data Start Date
Ethiopia
Maize 16.7 Jan 2000
Wheat 12.6 Jan 2000
Teff 10.9 Jan 2000
Sorgrum 14.1 March 2001
Uganda
Maize 10 Jan 2006
Rice 2 Jan 2006
Malawi
Rice 4 Jan 2007
Maize 54 May 2007
Tanzania
Maize 24.3 Jan 2006
Rice 9.1 Jan 2006
Beans 6.1 Jan 2006
Notes: Price data from FAOstata (http://faostat3.fao.org/home/). Percent of Calories each crop
represents comes from FAO reports from each country (Leete, 2013b,a; Kikafunda, 2010; Ahmed,
2011)
The means and standard deviations of these variables are listed in Tables 2.9-2.12
in the appendix.
An additional step was to calculate a staple food price index for each country
using price data from FAOStats access via http://faostat3.fao.org. For each country,
I weighed each crop for what data was available by the percent of calories each crop
constitutes in the local diet, as reported in FAO dietary reports for each country
(Leete, 2013b,a; Kikafunda, 2010; Ahmed, 2011). In Table 2.1 the crop prices that
were available for each countries, and the series start date, are listed.
2.3 Research Design
This paper uses two strategies to look at the impact of food price increases on
in-utero and early childhood development. The first strategy is to define periods of
crisis and to examine the impact that those periods have on children at various stages
of development during the crisis. The second strategy is estimate the relationship
between increases in local food prices and fetal and early childhood development.
This section lays out and reports the finding of the former strategies.
For the first strategy I define a set of variables for exposure to the crisis at various
stages of development. Each exposure variable is the portion of months of each period
that overlapped with the crisis. The developmental periods are early childhood (7
to 24 months old), infancy (0 to 6 months old), and the four trimesters prior to
birth. Including the four trimester prior to birth logically implies the first trimester
is prior to pregnancy. This control is included because hunger during the time could
influence fertility, the resulting male to female ratio, or influence the paragenome
of the future zygote. The term trimester is used to indicate months prior to birth.
Since we do not have data on if the children were born prematurely, this can differ
from the actual stage of the pregnancy. An alternative division of the ages after
birth that divides the periods into first and second year of life also reported as a
robustness test.
The complete estimating equation is :
HAZi =
2∑
t=−4
βtEt + βXi + βS + 
Where Et is the exposure to the crisis in each developmental stage. The subscript t
indicates each of the four trimester prior to birth and the two periods (infancy and
early childhood) after birth. The vector of controls, X, include if the household is
in a rural area, if the child is first born or female, the month of birth, region of the
country and the wealth quintile of the household. Additionally, a linear time control
is included and the child’s age at date of the survey is controlled by a series of cubic
splines (S). In all regressions the standard errors are clustered at the household level.
In the case of Malawi, I also include a dummy variable for the DHS survey, as
there is a known discrepancy in the HAZ reported by it and the LSMS surveys. The
assumption underlying this is that after controlling for covariates, any difference in
the average HAZ in the DHS survey is due to measurement error. Because there is
a risk that fertility is endogenous - that the most vulnerable households might have
fewer children during a crisis- the household fixed effects models are considered the
preferred specification.
To correct for the differences in timing of the international and local price spikes
I created a local food price proxy by predicting local crop prices with international
crop prices with nine lags for each crop, and then detrending the resulting series.
As with the international food price crisis is defined as being one standard deviation
above the trend. An alternative definition, based on the price index being 20% above
the mean, is reported in the appendix. Figure 2.2 shows the resulting definition. For
Ethiopia a continuous period of crisis results from May 2008 to February 2009, and
in Malawi continuous period of crisis (June 2008 to March 2009) follow lone months
of high prices in December 2007 and March 2008. Uganda has two periods of crisis
(April 2008 to July 2008 and April 2009 to November 2009) with two additional
months of high prices in-between. Tanzania, which as previously noted, there are
essentially no price spike, has 9 months labeled as crisis, but never more then two
months in row. I repeated the estimation strategy of examinining exposure to a crisis
utilizing this definition of crisis.
Lastly, to estimate the broader effect of food price rises regardless of if it consti-
tutes a crisis, I utilizied a similar equation as above, but with the exposure variables
replaced with the log of the average of the local food prices, PLt , for each period of
a child’s development, indicated with the subscript t.
HAZi =
2∑
t=−4
βtlog(P
L
t ) + βXi + 2
As before, the vector of controls, X, include if the household is in a rural area, if
the child is first born or female, the month of birth, the region of the country, and
the wealth quintile of the household. Additionally, a linear time control is included,
and the child’s age at the time of the survey is controlled by a series of cubic splines
(S). As in the previous regressions, in the case of Malawi, I also included a dummy
variable for the DHS surveys as there is a known discrepancy in the HAZ reported
from that survey and the DHS survey. The assumption underlying this is that after
controlling for covariates, any difference in average HAZ in the DHS survey is due
to a measurement error. In all regressions, the standard errors are clustered at the
household level.
A key difficulty for estimating the effect of a shock on children is separating
out the effect of age on height-for-age Z-scores. While the WHO growth standards
are labeled as being a measure of height for the child’s age, they are intended as
a measure of development that would occur in a nutritionally and environmentally
healthy setting that does not hinder the child’s development. For children in an
environment that will stunt growth it is common to find that children in nutritionally
or environmentally limiting situations appear close to mean height for age levels at
birth, rapid decay in Z-score over first 18-20 months, and then slowly start to recover.
Using the WHO standard without appropriately controlling for this effect would find
a spurious correlation with stunted growth during a period of 18-20 months before
the survey. Later in this section, I will lay out the strategy for utilizing the multiple
studies for controlling this timing artifact.
This timing artifact is highlighted in Figure 2.3 in the appendix, which shows
the average height-for-age Z-score for the children in the four countries by the age
in months. The children show very little stunting for several months and then dete-
riorate rapidly from months 3-18 before then stabilizing and slowly recovering. As
Figure 2.3 shows, during the months from 20-60, there are occasional small drops in
Z-scores, roughly at ages where children born during the food price spikes were at
times of various surveys. Accurate estimation requires separating out this potential
signal from the noise of the broader deterioration and recovery of height, which are
standard in these conditions.
To prevent a timing artifact from this relationship between height and age from
creating an omitted variable bias in a regression, Cummin (2013) recommends using
a cubic spline specification. A cubic spline model splits the range of a variable with
knots between the splines. Between adjacent knots, the function is allowed to take on
the form of a cubic polynomial, yet at the knots, the function is linear with smooth
first and second derivatives.
To create this functional form, a series of covariates are defined as a function of
the variable x and the locations of the knots(k).
The first covariate is simply x1 = x. Subsequent covariates are defined as
xj = (x− tj−1)3+ −
(x− tk−1)3+(tk − tj−1)
(tk − tk−1) +
(x− tk)3+(tk−1 − tj−1)
(tk − tk−1)
for j = 2, ..., k − 1 where
u+ =

0 if u < 0
u if u > 0
These covariates can then be used in linear regression:
y = a+ x1b1 + x2b2 + ...+ xk−1bk−1
To control the height-age relationship, I create splines with knots at 0, 3, 12 and
24 months. Figure 2.3 shows the resulting predicted Z-scores from this model, along
with a local polynomial of the actual height-for-age Z-score by age in months.
2.4 Empirical Findings
2.4.1 Effects of Crisis Exposure
Figure 2.1 shows the international price trend of the staple crops of rice, wheat
and maize combined into a single index. Defining a crisis as a time where the price
level is one standard deviation above the trend, there is distinct crisis existing from
March to August 2008. Figure 2.1 also shows a local polynomial height-for-age
Z-score - after partialling out the restricted cubic spline as explained later in this
section - by the month the children were born for children from all four countries.
From the graph we see that the modified height-for-age Z-score decreasing as the
birth date approaches the crisis - with the lowest heights for those born during the
crisis. More distinct is the immediate improvement in height-for-age for those born
after the crisis.
Table 2.4 reports the findings for each country, with and without fixed effects,
and for all countries pooled together. When the countries are pooled the effects
in both with and without household fixed effects are significant in the first and
third trimesters, and in early childhood and infancy. An optimistic take is that the
coefficients on these estimates are small. Focusing on the household fixed effects
model, going from no exposure to complete exposure in early childhood decreases
height-for-age by just .09 standard deviations, .15 deviations during infancy, .23
standard deviations for exposure in the third trimester, and .27 standard deviations
in the first trimester. In comparison children born during periods of seasonal hunger
in Tanzania are, in general, a third of a standard deviation shorter than their peers.
There is less consistency in the individual country regressions. In Ethiopia we see
a negative relationship between exposure and stature in the developmental periods
following birth, and the third and second trimesters, both with and without house-
hold fixed effects. In Malawi, we see small negative effects in the model without
fixed effects in the post birth periods, and in the first trimester. With household
fixed effects, the effects of infancy and early childhood become insignificant, but a
statistically significant effect can be observed in the third and trimester and trimester
before pregnancy. As I discuss below, there was relatively little pass through of the
international price increases to Uganda and Tanzania. As a result, we find fewer sta-
tistically significant impact of exposure for these two countries, except of a positive
relationship for infancy for Uganda with fixed effects, and for second trimester for
Tanzania with household fixed effects.
A possible explanation of the limited impact of the international price crisis on
children’s development is a result of delays or limitations in the transmission of
the international prices to the local context. In Figure 2.4 I show each country’s
price trend over a local polynomial of that country’s children’s modified height-
for-age Z-scores. I retain from Figure 2.1 the lines indicating the timing of the
international food price crisis and each countries regression discontinuity lines. For
Ethiopia Malawi, and Uganda we observe a local food price spike but with a delay
between the timing of the international food price spike and the local food price spike.
In Uganda, a second and more substantial food price spike occurs a few months later.
In Tanzania there are essentially no spikes in prices and little deviation from the
longer trend.
To correct for the differences in timing of the international and local price spikes,
I created a local food price proxy by predicting local crop prices with international
crop prices with nine lags for each crop and then detrending the resulting series.
As with the international food price crisis is defined as being one standard deviation
above the trend. An alternative definition, based on the price index being 20% above
the mean, is reported in the appendix. Figure 2.2 shows the resulting definition. For
Ethiopia, a continuous period of crisis results from May 2008 to February 2009, and
in Malawi continuous period of crisis (June 2008 to March 2009) follow lone months
of high prices in December 2007 and March 2008. Uganda has two periods of crisis
(April 2008 to July 2008 and April 2009 to November 2009) with two additional
months of high prices in-between. Tanzania, where as previously noted, there is
essentially no price spike, has 9 months labeled as a crisis, but never more than two
months in row.
I repeated the estimation of exposure to the food prices crisis but now with using
this definition of the local food price crisis. The results are reported in Table 2.3.
When the countries are pooled a consistent effect appears with negative effects for
exposure during early childhood, infancy, and third-trimester in-utero. Except the
household fixed effects model estimate on exposure in infancy, which is significant at
the p <.01 level, these estimates are all significant at the p <.001 level across both
the fixed effects and non-fixed effects models.
None of the other exposure coefficients are significant in the pooled regressions.
Most notably, the findings from the international price crisis regression that there was
a negative effect of the first trimester exposure has disappeared despite the standard
errors being smaller. The result in the international food price crisis regression was
likely a result of the delay in the transmission of the food price crisis, particularly
in Malawi. In the local food price regression Malawi instead now shows a weakly
significant positive relationship with the exposure to the food price crisis. For both
Ethiopia and Malawi, the two countries with the most distinct crisis, exposure during
the third trimester is consistently significant. In both countries the household fixed
effects model is showing a substantially larger effect from the third trimester effects
than the second, jumping from -.37 to -.69 in Ethiopia and from -.45 to -.82 for
Malawi. Ethiopia also shows an effect for early childhood and infancy, but this effect
does not appear for Malawi or any of the other countries.
Table 2.4 reports robustness regressions for local food price crisis model with
all the countries pooled. Columns 1 and 2 repeat the base model discussed above,
with and without fixed effects. Using quadratic time controls (columns 3 and 4)
or no time controls (columns 5 and 6) does not substantially change the results.
Using an alternative definition of crisis (columns 7 and 8) of where the detrended
prices rise 20% above the mean produces a small, weakly significant adverse effect
of first-trimester exposure. In the fixed effects model of the alternative definition
exposure in infancy is no longer statistically significant. Besides these differences,
the results of the alternative crisis definition are similar to the base model. Lastly, an
alternative breakdown of child ages is provided in columns 9 and 10, with exposure
to first or second year of life. Full tables with individual country results for these
robustness models and with breakdowns by gender and rural or urban are provided
in the appendix.
2.4.2 Effects of Food Price Rises
The second strategy is to examine the impact of food prices on children’s height
directly, regardless of if the price constitutes a crisis or not. In these models, the
exposure variables are replaced with the log of local prices for each period of a
child’s life. The pooled models show negative effects for early childhood and the
third trimester with and without fixed effects. In the model without household fixed
Figure 2.1. International Prices and Modified Height for Age
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Figure 2.1 notes: Black line shows international prices, dashed vertical lines indicate the months of
the international food price crisis. Gray lines are local polynomial of Height-for-age by month of
birth, after cubic spline of age in months have been partialled out.
Table 2.2. Effects of Exposure to International Food Price Crisis
All Ethiopia Malawi Uganda Tanzania
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
FE FE FE FE FE
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Exposure to Crisis During:
-Early Childhood (7-24mo) -0.11∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗ -0.47∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗ -0.09∗ -0.05 0.14 0.19 -0.10 -0.17
(0.02) (0.04) (0.09) (0.11) (0.04) (0.07) (0.13) (0.13) (0.07) (0.11)
-Infancy (0-6mo) -0.15∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗ -0.43∗∗∗ -0.38∗∗∗ -0.13∗ -0.11 0.26∗ 0.12 -0.11 -0.21
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.11) (0.06) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.20)
-Third Trimester -0.19∗∗ -0.23∗ -0.32∗∗ -0.40∗ -0.14 -0.48∗ -0.14 0.13 -0.25 -0.35
(0.06) (0.10) (0.11) (0.19) (0.10) (0.19) (0.16) (0.21) (0.17) (0.27)
-Second Trimester -0.12 -0.08 -0.68∗∗∗ -0.66∗∗ -0.02 0.34 0.21 0.08 0.49∗ 0.42
(0.08) (0.11) (0.14) (0.22) (0.13) (0.20) (0.20) (0.27) (0.20) (0.30)
-First Trimester -0.19∗ -0.27∗ -0.06 -0.09 -0.27∗ -0.65∗∗∗ -0.23 -0.21 -0.16 -0.35
(0.08) (0.12) (0.14) (0.22) (0.13) (0.19) (0.19) (0.27) (0.20) (0.33)
-Trimester Before Conception 0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.09 0.08 0.25∗∗ -0.04 0.05 0.15 0.11
(0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.15) (0.10) (0.16)
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 48500 48500 14366 14366 14479 14479 6620 6620 13055 13055
R-Squared 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.22
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 Crisis is defined as period when international prices
1 SD above detrended price mean. Controls not reported include birth month, first born, female,
region, wealth index and cubic spline of age in months. A linear time trend is also controlled for.
Standard Errors are clustered at household level.
Figure 2.2. Local Food Prices & Crisis Months
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Figure 2.2 notes: Dashed line shows actual local prices relative to 2010 levels. Black line shows
detrended local prices predicted from international prices. Gray line shows months where the
predicted prices are 1 SD above the trend and considered a crisis.
Table 2.3. Effects of Exposure to Local Food Price Crisis
All Ethiopia Malawi Uganda Tanzania
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
FE FE FE FE FE
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Exposure to Crisis During:
-Early Childhood (7-24mo) -0.15∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗ -0.32∗∗ -0.08 0.01 0.15 0.23 -0.24 -0.13
(0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.05) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.33)
-Infancy (0-6mo) -0.19∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗ -0.17∗ -0.30∗ -0.02 0.09 0.22 0.07 -0.17 -0.07
(0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.14) (0.11) (0.20) (0.14) (0.16) (0.21) (0.41)
-Third Trimester -0.25∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ -0.37∗ -0.69∗∗ -0.45∗ -0.82∗∗ -0.16 0.25 -0.14 -0.02
(0.06) (0.08) (0.17) (0.27) (0.18) (0.30) (0.18) (0.23) (0.15) (0.33)
-Second Trimester -0.01 -0.04 0.09 0.11 -0.02 0.15 0.21 -0.20 0.01 0.25
(0.06) (0.08) (0.20) (0.31) (0.20) (0.33) (0.18) (0.23) (0.15) (0.34)
-First Trimester -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.41∗ 0.38∗ 0.53∗ -0.31 0.15 -0.11 0.02
(0.05) (0.08) (0.14) (0.21) (0.15) (0.25) (0.17) (0.23) (0.15) (0.34)
-Trimester Before Conception -0.01 -0.02 0.23∗∗∗ 0.09 -0.08 0.07 0.20 0.10 -0.23 -0.25
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.34)
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 48500 48500 14366 14366 14479 14479 6620 6620 13055 13055
R-Squared 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.23
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 Crisis is defined as period when local prices 1 SD above
detrended price mean.Controls not reported include birth month, first born, female, region, wealth
index and cubic spline of age in months. A linear time trend is also controlled for. . Standard
Errors are clustered at household level.
Table 2.4. Robustness Regressions for the Effects of Exposure to Local Food Price
Crisis
Base Quadratic No Trend Alt. Crisis Definition Alternative Periodization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
-Second Year -0.10∗∗ -0.14∗∗
(0.03) (0.05)
-First Year -0.22∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06)
-Early Childhood (7-24mo) -0.15∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -0.10∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
-Infancy (0-6mo) -0.19∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗ -0.16∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.18∗ -0.13∗∗ -0.10
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06)
-Third Trimester -0.25∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08)
-Second Trimester -0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.08 -0.04 0.00 -0.07 -0.08 0.00 -0.01
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09)
-First Trimester -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.12 -0.07 -0.03 -0.12∗ -0.20∗ -0.03 -0.05
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08)
-Trimester Before Conception -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 -0.00 -0.04 -0.13∗ -0.01 -0.02
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
Observations 48500 48500 48500 48500 48500 48500 48500 48500 48500 48500
R-Squared 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.15
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic Time Control Yes Yes
Alternative Crisis Definition Yes Yes
Alternative Age Periodization Yes Yes
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 not reported include birth month, first born, female,
region, wealth index and cubic spline of age in months. Standard Errors are clustered at household
level. Columns 1 & 2 are the base model, columns 3 & 4 include quadratic time control, columns 5
& 6 have no time trend. Columns 7 & 8 use the alternative definition of crisis based on prices rising
20%. Columns 9 & 10 use alternative periodization of early childhood, breaking early childhood
into first and second year.
effects, there is also a small negative effect on the quarter before pregnancy and a
positive effect on prices during the first trimester.
One counter-intuitive result stands out. Local prices during infancy – 0 to 6
months old – have a substantial and statistically significant positive impact on the
stature of children. This result is both counter-intuitive and contradicts the results
of the crisis models. Robustness checks for alternative periodization are included in
Table 2.8. Columns 7 and 8 report breaking ages into the first and second year. The
first year coefficient in the model without household fixed effect is smaller the infant
(0-6 months old) coefficient in the base model, and it is statistically insignificant in
household fixed effects model. A third possible periodization is reported in columns
9 and 10, with age divided into infant (0-6 months old), toddler (7-12 months old),
and second year of life. The infant coefficient is still positive and strongly statistically
significant both with and without household fixed effects. The toddler coefficients
are negative but statistically insignificant. A possible hypothesis for further study
is if this outcome is the result of childcare practices responding to prices. Some
studies have found the duration of exclusive breastfeeding has been shown to be
endogenous to the conditions at the time and the health of the child (Simondon and
Simondon, 1998). In return, the duration of exclusive breastfeeding has been found–
after controlling for conditions and health at birth– to be positively correlated with
a child’s stature (Simondon et al., 2001; Onyango et al., 1999).
Although the results are not precise in the separate country regressions, we can
note a consistent negative relationship, with the sole exception of Uganda in the
model without the household fixed effects. In the pooled household fixed effects
model, the result is a highly significant (p <.001) estimate of -1.20. This result
implies that a 30% increase in prices would decrease a child’s z-score by .315 standard
deviations. This estimate is similar to what is seen in Tanzania during the hunger
season both in terms of increase in price and decrease in height-for-age Z-scores.
During the Ethiopian food price crisis, local prices were roughly 50% higher than
before the crisis. According to this estimate, this should cause a decrease in stature
of .48 standard deviations. This result is not quite as large as our finding of a .69
standard deviation effect of being born during the crisis in the household fixed effects
model of the local price crisis (Table 2.3). In Malawi the prices roughly doubled
during the crisis. According to our estimate of Z-scores decreasing 1.2 times a log
in prices that a doubling in prices would be expected to reduce the height by .83
standard deviations. This result is almost identical to the -.82 found for Malawis
household fixed effects model in Table 2.3.
Looking at the regressions decomposed by gender (Table 2.6), we see that fe-
males appear to have less sensitivity to effects of price movement than males if third
trimester and after birth, however, these difference are small and statistically insignif-
icant. The female pooled regressions we see statistically significant adverse effect of
prices before pregnancy then a positive effect from the first trimester. Existing lit-
erature has found that stress before conception increases the probability of a female
child (Grant and Chamley, 2010). For example, the ratio of males to females dropped
in the United States 40 weeks after the September 11 attacks (Catalano et al., 2005).
To test this explanation, I ran a linear probability model of the likelihood of a child
being female compared with prices during and before pregnancy, with controls for the
region, rural, wealth, and birth month. The only statistically significant predictor
was the prices for the quarter before pregnancy, which indicated that a 30% increase
in prices during the trimester would cause a 1.3% increase in the number of females.
Looking at the country specific models of the effect of prices on height (Table 2.6) we
see only an effect for Uganda males. This effect is positive and very large. Looking
at the country specific linear probability model of a child being female, we see that
only Uganda has a statistically significant effect from prices before pregnancy. The
coefficient implies that a 30% increase in prices increases the probability of a child
being female 6.4 percentage points. Future research will be necessary to examine
why this effect is found in Uganda and not in other countries in the sample.
Table 2.5. Effect of (Log) Local Prices on Height
All Ethiopia Malawi Uganda Tanzania
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
FE FE FE FE FE
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Log of Proxy Prices for:
-Early Childhood (7-24mo) -0.73∗∗∗ -1.17∗∗∗ -0.49 -1.04 -0.52 -0.52 2.96 2.69 0.03 -0.57
(0.17) (0.26) (0.35) (0.54) (1.02) (2.24) (1.89) (2.84) (0.76) (1.60)
-Infancy (0-6mo) 0.75∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.29 0.43 0.64 0.57 -0.73 -0.61 0.22 0.11
(0.14) (0.23) (0.29) (0.45) (0.47) (0.92) (0.71) (1.04) (0.44) (0.90)
-Third Trimester -0.88∗∗∗ -1.20∗∗∗ -0.66 -0.82 -0.09 -1.92∗ 0.02 -0.61 -0.37 -0.10
(0.15) (0.26) (0.38) (0.58) (0.42) (0.77) (0.39) (0.60) (0.28) (0.49)
-Second Trimester 0.19 0.50 0.18 -0.15 -0.07 1.39 -0.27 0.50 0.13 0.21
(0.18) (0.31) (0.39) (0.64) (0.44) (0.93) (0.42) (0.60) (0.29) (0.57)
-First Trimester 0.35 0.06 0.67 1.33∗ -0.00 -0.23 -0.15 -0.36 -0.08 -0.29
(0.18) (0.32) (0.40) (0.64) (0.43) (0.94) (0.44) (0.62) (0.28) (0.53)
-Trimester Before Pregnancy -0.23 -0.30 0.13 -0.66 0.29 -0.43 0.82∗ 0.62 0.00 -0.07
(0.12) (0.21) (0.28) (0.44) (0.39) (0.78) (0.37) (0.51) (0.22) (0.42)
Observations 37937 37937 13893 13893 7489 7489 5899 5899 10656 10656
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.187 0.168 0.217 0.069 0.097 0.110 0.141 0.182 0.247
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 Controls not reported include birth month, first
born, female, region, wealth index and cubic spline of age in months. A linear time trend is also
controlled forStandard Errors are clustered at household level.
Table 2.6. Effect of (Log) Local Prices on Height by Gender
All Ethiopia Malawi Uganda Tanzania
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Log of Proxy Prices for:
-Early Childhood (7-24mo) -1.01∗∗∗ -0.42 0.08 -1.06∗ -2.20 1.14 3.96 2.48 -0.53 0.36
(0.24) (0.25) (0.48) (0.51) (1.43) (1.44) (2.70) (2.52) (1.10) (1.03)
-Infancy (0-6mo) 0.92∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗ 0.15 0.45 0.79 0.45 -0.74 -0.86 0.83 -0.15
(0.21) (0.19) (0.41) (0.41) (0.68) (0.65) (1.03) (0.95) (0.65) (0.60)
-Third Trimester -1.01∗∗∗ -0.79∗∗∗ -0.56 -0.76 0.27 -0.37 0.13 -0.09 -0.47 -0.39
(0.22) (0.21) (0.53) (0.54) (0.59) (0.59) (0.58) (0.52) (0.41) (0.37)
-Second Trimester 0.30 0.08 0.06 0.25 0.48 -0.60 -0.47 -0.08 0.29 -0.07
(0.26) (0.24) (0.55) (0.55) (0.61) (0.62) (0.64) (0.56) (0.42) (0.40)
-First Trimester 0.19 0.54∗ 0.59 0.81 -0.92 0.73 -0.81 0.67 0.03 -0.14
(0.26) (0.24) (0.57) (0.56) (0.63) (0.59) (0.68) (0.58) (0.39) (0.39)
-Trimester Before Pregnancy -0.12 -0.36∗ 0.36 -0.15 0.38 0.35 2.01∗∗∗ -0.41 -0.16 0.10
(0.17) (0.16) (0.40) (0.40) (0.56) (0.54) (0.57) (0.50) (0.31) (0.30)
Observations 19095 18842 7099 6794 3757 3732 2960 2939 5279 5377
Adjusted R2 0.130 0.144 0.165 0.172 0.068 0.063 0.114 0.103 0.155 0.194
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 Controls not reported include birth month, first
born, female, region, wealth index and cubic spline of age in months. A linear time trend is also
controlled forStandard Errors are clustered at household level.
2.5 Conclusion
A key finding of this study is the difference in outcome for Ethiopia and Malawi,
which had substantial domestic food price spikes, and Uganda and Tanzania, which
had more modest price increases. Both Ethiopia and Malawi saw a decrease in the
height-for-age Z-scores of children that were in the final two trimesters of pregnancy
or under two years of age. Neither Uganda or Tanzania had statistically significant
decrease in height in any of the periods of development. This story is strengthened
when we looked at the period of high prices domestically. For those in third-trimester
in-utero during the local crisis children’s height-for-age Z-score compared to their
siblings dropped .69 standard deviations in Ethiopia and .82 standard deviations
for Malawi. Again we failed to find a statistically significant effect in Uganda or
Table 2.7. Effect of (Log) Local Prices on Height by Location
All Ethiopia Malawi Uganda Tanzania
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Log of Proxy Prices for:
-Early Childhood (7-24mo) -0.56∗∗ -1.27∗∗ -0.63 0.09 -0.32 -1.41 4.55∗ -3.84 0.36 -1.73
(0.19) (0.40) (0.39) (0.78) (1.13) (2.44) (2.12) (3.93) (0.84) (1.74)
-Infancy (0-6mo) 0.70∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗ 0.24 0.82 0.56 1.04 -1.39 2.28 0.29 0.09
(0.16) (0.33) (0.32) (0.64) (0.52) (1.13) (0.80) (1.50) (0.49) (1.00)
-Third Trimester -0.86∗∗∗ -1.08∗∗ -0.32 -2.71∗∗ -0.13 0.08 0.10 -0.46 -0.31 -0.56
(0.17) (0.35) (0.42) (0.83) (0.47) (1.02) (0.43) (0.86) (0.31) (0.58)
-Second Trimester 0.15 0.36 -0.13 1.83∗ 0.01 -0.62 -0.02 -1.13 -0.06 0.68
(0.20) (0.41) (0.43) (0.89) (0.49) (1.02) (0.46) (1.01) (0.32) (0.64)
-First Trimester 0.39∗ 0.17 0.67 0.72 -0.02 0.11 -0.36 0.57 0.08 -0.57
(0.20) (0.43) (0.44) (0.96) (0.46) (1.13) (0.48) (1.04) (0.31) (0.62)
-Trimester Before Pregnancy -0.23 -0.20 0.24 -0.36 0.32 0.24 1.10∗∗ -0.10 0.03 -0.21
(0.13) (0.28) (0.32) (0.64) (0.43) (0.95) (0.41) (0.89) (0.24) (0.49)
Observations 31232 6705 11743 2150 6299 1190 4837 1062 8353 2303
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.129 0.155 0.184 0.072 0.050 0.107 0.074 0.172 0.179
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 Controls not reported include birth month, first
born, female, region, wealth index and cubic spline of age in months. A linear time trend is also
controlled forStandard Errors are clustered at household level.
Table 2.8. Robustness Regressions for the Effects of Local Food Price Rises
Base Quadratic No Trend Alt. Periodization Alt. Periodization 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Log of Proxy Prices for:
-Early Childhood (7-24mo) -0.73∗∗∗ -1.17∗∗∗ -0.72∗∗∗ -0.99∗∗∗ -0.52∗∗ -1.09∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.26) (0.18) (0.27) (0.17) (0.26)
-Second year -0.68∗∗∗ -0.91∗∗∗ -0.61∗∗∗ -0.72∗∗
(0.15) (0.24) (0.15) (0.25)
–Toddler (7mo-12mo) -0.05 -0.49
(0.17) (0.28)
-First Year 0.57∗∗∗ 0.38
(0.14) (0.24)
-Infancy (0-6mo) 0.75∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.60∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.23) (0.15) (0.26) (0.14) (0.23) (0.17) (0.27)
-Third Trimester -0.88∗∗∗ -1.20∗∗∗ -0.88∗∗∗ -1.15∗∗∗ -1.01∗∗∗ -1.17∗∗∗ -0.73∗∗∗ -0.97∗∗∗ -0.86∗∗∗ -1.21∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.26) (0.15) (0.26) (0.15) (0.26) (0.14) (0.25) (0.15) (0.26)
-Second Trimester 0.19 0.50 0.19 0.49 0.26 0.49 0.20 0.54 0.20 0.50
(0.18) (0.31) (0.18) (0.31) (0.18) (0.31) (0.18) (0.31) (0.18) (0.31)
-First Trimester 0.35 0.06 0.35 0.04 0.23 0.08 0.23 -0.06 0.31 0.08
(0.18) (0.32) (0.18) (0.32) (0.18) (0.32) (0.18) (0.32) (0.18) (0.32)
-Trimester Before Pregnancy -0.23 -0.30 -0.24∗ -0.37 0.04 -0.33 -0.15 -0.22 -0.20 -0.31
(0.12) (0.21) (0.12) (0.21) (0.12) (0.21) (0.12) (0.21) (0.12) (0.21)
Observations 37937 37937 37937 37937 37937 37937 37937 37937 37937 37937.00
R-Squared 0.14 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.14 0.19
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic Time Control Yes Yes
Alternative Age Periodization Yes Yes
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 Controls not reported include birth month, first born,
female, region, wealth index and cubic spline of age in months. Standard Errors are clustered at
household level. Columns 1 & 2 are the base model, columns 3 & 4 include quadratic time control,
columns 5 & 6 have no time trend. Columns 7 & 8 use alternative periodization of early childhood,
breaking early childhood into first and second year. Columns 9 & 10 use another alternative
periodization that breaks ages into first six months, from 6mo-12mo, and second year of life.
Tanzania. These results give hope that if countries can prevent international food
price spike from rising local food prices, they can prevent harm to their population.
Looking at the effect of food prices on children’s development reinforced the
finding that the third trimester seems to be sensitive period in-utero. I found that
a log increase in prices decreased the height by 1.2 standard deviations. This result
implies that a 30% increase in prices would reduce the stature of a child that is in
the third trimester by .315 standard deviations. Urban areas the are less likely to
have land to produce their own food were especially sensitive to price changes.
Two additional findings call for future research. First, an unexpected finding
was that infants zero to six months old had a positive response in their development
to food prices. Exisiting literature finding that breastfeeding duractions responds
to child health and the duration positively impact catch up growth could provide a
possible explanation, but confirmation requires additional research. Second, consis-
tent with there was evidence that stress prior to pregnancy reduces conception of
male children, I find that in Uganda prices before pregnancy increase the probability
of child being female. Examining why this effect is only found in Uganda is left for
future research.
2.6 Appendix
Table 2.9. Summary Statistics for Ethiopia
LSMS DHS
2011 2013 2011 Total
Height-For-Age Zscore -1.69 -1.48 -1.61 -1.60
(1.94) (1.84) (1.76) (1.80)
Rural 0.93 0.78 0.84 0.84
(0.26) (0.41) (0.37) (0.36)
First Born 0.70 0.35 0.19 0.30
(0.46) (0.48) (0.39) (0.46)
Female 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.49
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Age in Months 32.41 33.21 29.41 30.54
(15.10) (15.70) (17.26) (16.75)
Year of Birth:
2006 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.11
(0.07) (0.02) (0.37) (0.31)
2007 0.20 0.00 0.21 0.17
(0.40) (0.05) (0.41) (0.38)
2008 0.23 0.01 0.20 0.17
(0.42) (0.10) (0.40) (0.38)
2009 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.39)
2010 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21
(0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41)
2011 0.12 0.22 0.04 0.08
(0.32) (0.42) (0.18) (0.27)
2012 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.04
(0.04) (0.41) (0.00) (0.19)
2013 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.03
(0.00) (0.35) (0.00) (0.16)
Wealth Index
Poorest 0.16 0.23 0.31 0.27
(0.37) (0.42) (0.46) (0.44)
Poorer 0.21 0.24 0.18 0.20
(0.40) (0.43) (0.39) (0.40)
Middle 0.23 0.23 0.17 0.19
(0.42) (0.42) (0.37) (0.39)
Richer 0.22 0.16 0.16 0.17
(0.42) (0.36) (0.37) (0.38)
Richest 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.17
(0.38) (0.35) (0.38) (0.38)
Observations 2209 2545 9611 14365
Table 2.10. Summary Statistics for Malawi
LSMS DHS
2011 2013 2011 Total
Height-For-Age Zscore -1.34 -1.12 -1.78 -1.44
(1.64) (1.60) (1.58) (1.63)
Rural 0.84 0.78 0.90 0.85
(0.36) (0.41) (0.30) (0.36)
First Born 0.79 0.81 0.18 0.60
(0.40) (0.40) (0.39) (0.49)
Female 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Age in Months 32.67 32.03 29.38 31.52
(15.06) (15.89) (16.70) (15.80)
Year of Birth:
2006 0.22 0.00 0.19 0.18
(0.42) (0.02) (0.39) (0.38)
2007 0.24 0.00 0.20 0.19
(0.43) (0.00) (0.40) (0.39)
2008 0.24 0.09 0.22 0.20
(0.42) (0.28) (0.41) (0.40)
2009 0.25 0.22 0.29 0.26
(0.43) (0.41) (0.45) (0.44)
2010 0.06 0.21 0.10 0.09
(0.23) (0.41) (0.30) (0.29)
2011 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.04
(0.01) (0.42) (0.00) (0.19)
2012 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.04
(0.00) (0.41) (0.00) (0.19)
2013 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.19) (0.00) (0.08)
Wealth Index
Poorest 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.20
(0.40) (0.41) (0.40) (0.40)
Poorer 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.22
(0.41) (0.42) (0.42) (0.41)
Middle 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.22
(0.41) (0.40) (0.42) (0.41)
Richer 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20
(0.41) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40)
Richest 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.16
(0.37) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36)
Observations 7499 2396 4586 14481
Table 2.11. Summary Statistics for Uganda
LSMS DHS
2009 2010 2011 2011 Total
Height-For-Age Zscore -1.39 -1.41 -1.39 -1.38 -1.39
(1.68) (1.51) (1.47) (1.54) (1.55)
Rural 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.79 0.82
(0.39) (0.37) (0.36) (0.41) (0.38)
First Born 0.60 0.67 0.66 0.17 0.50
(0.49) (0.47) (0.47) (0.38) (0.50)
Female 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.50
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Age in Months 26.98 32.35 31.77 27.88 29.55
(12.72) (14.80) (15.20) (16.98) (15.33)
Year of Birth:
2006 0.25 0.16 0.00 0.04 0.11
(0.43) (0.36) (0.06) (0.21) (0.31)
2007 0.28 0.23 0.13 0.19 0.21
(0.45) (0.42) (0.34) (0.39) (0.41)
2008 0.28 0.24 0.23 0.19 0.23
(0.45) (0.43) (0.42) (0.39) (0.42)
2009 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20
(0.39) (0.41) (0.41) (0.40) (0.40)
2010 0.01 0.14 0.21 0.21 0.15
(0.08) (0.35) (0.40) (0.41) (0.35)
2011 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.16 0.10
(0.00) (0.11) (0.40) (0.37) (0.30)
2012 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.06)
Wealth Index
Poorest 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.25 0.23
(0.41) (0.42) (0.41) (0.44) (0.42)
Poorer 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.21
(0.41) (0.41) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41)
Middle 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.18 0.20
(0.41) (0.39) (0.41) (0.38) (0.40)
Richer 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.19
(0.40) (0.39) (0.39) (0.37) (0.39)
Richest 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.18
(0.37) (0.38) (0.38) (0.40) (0.38)
Observations 1565 1496 1492 2070 6623
Table 2.12. Summary Statistics for Tanzania
LSMS DHS
2008 2010 2012 2010 Total
Height-For-Age Zscore -1.65 -1.35 -1.36 -1.62 -1.52
(1.46) (1.53) (1.58) (1.44) (1.50)
Rural 0.74 0.77 0.76 0.82 0.79
(0.44) (0.42) (0.43) (0.39) (0.41)
First Born 0.31 0.24 0.33 0.19 0.24
(0.46) (0.43) (0.47) (0.39) (0.43)
Female 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Age in Months 27.46 28.98 29.36 28.28 28.55
(14.44) (17.50) (17.44) (17.23) (17.03)
Year of Birth:
2006 0.25 0.13 0.00 0.19 0.15
(0.44) (0.33) (0.00) (0.40) (0.35)
2007 0.26 0.19 0.00 0.19 0.16
(0.44) (0.39) (0.07) (0.39) (0.36)
2008 0.18 0.19 0.14 0.21 0.19
(0.38) (0.39) (0.35) (0.41) (0.39)
2009 0.31 0.21 0.18 0.36 0.29
(0.46) (0.40) (0.39) (0.48) (0.45)
2010 0.00 0.22 0.21 0.04 0.11
(0.00) (0.42) (0.41) (0.20) (0.31)
2011 0.00 0.06 0.19 0.00 0.05
(0.00) (0.24) (0.39) (0.00) (0.23)
2012 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.41) (0.00) (0.21)
2013 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.23) (0.00) (0.11)
Wealth Index
Poorest 0.20 0.24 0.24 0.20 0.22
(0.40) (0.43) (0.43) (0.40) (0.41)
Poorer 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.24
(0.42) (0.43) (0.43) (0.42) (0.43)
Middle 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.21
(0.41) (0.42) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41)
Richer 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.18
(0.40) (0.36) (0.36) (0.40) (0.39)
Richest 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.15
(0.36) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.35)
Observations 1721 2652 3258 6792 14423
Figure 2.3. Height-for-Age Zscore by Month Age
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Figure 2.3 notes: Solid gray line shows a local polynomial of height-for-age by age in months, for a
countries surveys pooled together, with its confidence interval. The dashed line shows the predicted
height for age from a restricted cubic spline model with knots at months 3, 12 and 24.
Figure 2.4. Local Polynomials of Modified Height for Age
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Figure 2.4 notes: Black line shows actual local prices, dashed vertical lines indicate the months of
the international food price crisis. Gray lines are local polynomial of height-for-age by month of
birth after partialling out cubic spline of age in months.
Table 2.13. Effects of Exposure to Local Food Price Crisis
All Ethiopia Malawi Uganda Tanzania
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
FE FE FE FE FE
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Exposure to Crisis During:
-Early Childhood (7-24mo) -0.14∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.38∗∗∗ -0.09 -0.04 0.18 0.24 -0.15∗ -0.08
(0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.07) (0.13)
-Infancy (0-6mo) -0.13∗∗ -0.10 -0.22∗∗ -0.34∗∗ -0.29∗ -0.01 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.33
(0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.21) (0.13) (0.15) (0.11) (0.17)
-Third Trimester -0.18∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ -0.34∗ -0.58∗ 0.11 0.15 -0.07 0.02 0.07 0.09
(0.05) (0.08) (0.15) (0.23) (0.18) (0.33) (0.14) (0.18) (0.12) (0.20)
-Second Trimester -0.07 -0.08 -0.28 -0.46 -0.13 -0.31 0.12 0.10 0.24 0.39
(0.06) (0.08) (0.19) (0.29) (0.21) (0.35) (0.14) (0.20) (0.15) (0.23)
-First Trimester -0.12∗ -0.20∗ 0.22 0.17 -0.19 -0.28 -0.19 -0.02 0.13 0.06
(0.06) (0.08) (0.16) (0.24) (0.20) (0.32) (0.15) (0.19) (0.17) (0.25)
-Trimester Before Conception -0.04 -0.13∗ 0.04 -0.23∗ 0.03 0.40∗ 0.17 0.14 0.05 0.12
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.13) (0.19) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.21)
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 48500 48500 14366 14366 14479 14479 6620 6620 13055 13055
R-Squared 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.23
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 Crisis is defined as period when local prices 20%
above detrended price mean. Controls not reported include birth month, first born, female, region,
wealth index and cubic spline of age in months. A linear time trend is also controlled forStandard
Errors are clustered at household level.
Table 2.14. Effects of Exposure to Local Food Price Crisis by Gender
All Ethiopia Malawi Uganda Tanzania
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Exposure to Crisis During:
-Early Childhood (7-24mo) -0.11∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.09 -0.28∗∗ -0.08 -0.09 0.05 0.27 -0.27 -0.26
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.15) (0.20) (0.22) (0.19)
-Infancy (0-6mo) -0.14 -0.24∗∗∗ -0.07 -0.27∗ -0.11 0.09 0.29 0.16 -0.19 -0.17
(0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.19) (0.20) (0.31) (0.28)
-Third Trimester -0.27∗∗ -0.22∗∗ -0.38 -0.35 -0.42 -0.51∗ -0.33 0.04 -0.16 -0.14
(0.08) (0.08) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.22) (0.19)
-Second Trimester 0.01 -0.02 0.28 -0.10 0.25 -0.31 0.10 0.33 -0.04 0.04
(0.08) (0.08) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.27) (0.26) (0.24) (0.23) (0.19)
-First Trimester -0.02 -0.05 -0.12 0.03 0.23 0.53∗ -0.43 -0.18 -0.04 -0.24
(0.08) (0.08) (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.21) (0.24) (0.22) (0.23) (0.20)
Household Fixed Effects
Observations 24379 24140 7340 7026 7211 7368 3323 3297 6505 6550
R-Squared 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.18 0.19
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 Crisis is defined as period when local prices 1 SD
above detrended price mean. Controls not reported include birth month, first born, female, region,
wealth index and cubic spline of age in months. A linear time trend is also controlled forStandard
Errors are clustered at household level.
Table 2.15. Effects of Exposure to Local Food Price Crisis by Location
All Ethiopia Malawi Uganda Tanzania
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Exposure to Crisis During:
-Early Childhood (7-24mo) -0.17∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.18∗ -0.24 -0.13∗ 0.22 0.15 0.17 -0.34∗ 0.16
(0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.15) (0.06) (0.16) (0.14) (0.24) (0.15) (0.35)
-Infancy (0-6mo) -0.25∗∗∗ 0.10 -0.18 -0.14 -0.09 0.30 0.05 1.07∗∗∗ -0.23 0.11
(0.05) (0.12) (0.10) (0.20) (0.12) (0.32) (0.15) (0.30) (0.23) (0.47)
-Third Trimester -0.23∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗ -0.33 -0.60 -0.56∗∗ 0.07 -0.04 -0.76∗ -0.19 0.09
(0.06) (0.13) (0.19) (0.36) (0.19) (0.49) (0.20) (0.36) (0.16) (0.36)
-Second Trimester -0.06 0.19 0.03 0.33 0.04 -0.55 0.20 0.32 -0.10 0.39
(0.06) (0.13) (0.22) (0.44) (0.22) (0.52) (0.19) (0.40) (0.16) (0.35)
-First Trimester -0.07 0.15 -0.08 0.21 0.28 0.94∗ -0.38∗ 0.10 -0.16 0.14
(0.06) (0.13) (0.16) (0.32) (0.17) (0.43) (0.18) (0.35) (0.16) (0.36)
Household Fixed Effects
Observations 40561 7959 12099 2267 12332 2147 5440 1180 10690 2365
R-Squared 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.17 0.20
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 Crisis is defined as period when local prices 1 SD
above detrended price mean. Controls not reported include birth month, first born, female, region,
wealth index and cubic spline of age in months. A linear time trend is also controlled forStandard
Errors are clustered at household level.
Table 2.16. Effects of Exposure to Local Food Price Crisis-Quadratic Time Control
All Ethiopia Malawi Uganda Tanzania
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
FE FE FE FE FE
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Exposure to Crisis During:
-Early Childhood (7-24mo) -0.13∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.12 -0.22∗ -0.01 0.03 0.14 0.03 -0.28 -0.12
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.15) (0.16) (0.21) (0.40)
-Infancy (0-6mo) -0.16∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗ -0.35∗ 0.20 0.16 0.20 -0.37 -0.18 -0.07
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.13) (0.23) (0.20) (0.27) (0.21) (0.42)
-Third Trimester -0.23∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.39∗ -0.70∗∗ -0.34 -0.79∗ -0.18 -0.11 -0.14 -0.02
(0.06) (0.09) (0.17) (0.27) (0.18) (0.31) (0.22) (0.29) (0.15) (0.34)
-Second Trimester 0.01 -0.08 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.20 0.20 -0.52 -0.00 0.26
(0.06) (0.09) (0.20) (0.31) (0.21) (0.35) (0.21) (0.28) (0.16) (0.35)
-First Trimester -0.02 -0.12 -0.12 -0.49∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.59∗ -0.32 -0.13 -0.13 0.02
(0.06) (0.09) (0.15) (0.21) (0.17) (0.26) (0.19) (0.26) (0.17) (0.36)
-Trimester Before Conception 0.01 -0.07 0.16∗ 0.01 0.08 0.12 0.19 -0.06 -0.25 -0.25
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.09) (0.14) (0.12) (0.16) (0.19) (0.38)
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 48500 48500 14366 14366 14479 14479 6620 6620 13055 13055
R-Squared 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.23
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 Crisis is defined as period when international prices
1 SD above detrended price mean. Controls not reported include birth month, first born, female,
region, wealth index and cubic spline of age in months. A quadratic time trend is also controlled
forStandard Errors are clustered at household level.
Table 2.17. Effects of Exposure to Local Food Price Crisis-No Time Control
All Ethiopia Malawi Uganda Tanzania
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
FE FE FE FE FE
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Exposure to Crisis During:
-Early Childhood (7-24mo) -0.20∗∗∗ -0.10∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ 0.04 0.38∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ -0.25 -0.13
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.33)
-Infancy (0-6mo) -0.23∗∗∗ -0.18∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.29∗ -0.20 0.11 0.35∗∗ 0.15 -0.17 -0.07
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.13) (0.11) (0.20) (0.13) (0.16) (0.21) (0.41)
-Third Trimester -0.29∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗ -0.46∗∗ -0.69∗∗ -0.61∗∗∗ -0.80∗∗ -0.05 0.33 -0.14 -0.02
(0.06) (0.08) (0.17) (0.27) (0.18) (0.30) (0.17) (0.23) (0.15) (0.33)
-Second Trimester -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.12 -0.18 0.15 0.28 -0.16 0.00 0.25
(0.06) (0.08) (0.20) (0.31) (0.20) (0.33) (0.18) (0.23) (0.15) (0.34)
-First Trimester -0.07 -0.03 -0.12 -0.41∗ 0.25 0.54∗ -0.26 0.18 -0.12 0.02
(0.05) (0.08) (0.14) (0.21) (0.15) (0.25) (0.16) (0.23) (0.15) (0.34)
-Trimester Before Conception -0.03 -0.00 0.18∗∗ 0.09 -0.14 0.06 0.19 0.10 -0.24 -0.25
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.34)
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 48500 48500 14366 14366 14479 14479 6620 6620 13055 13055
R-Squared 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.23
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 Crisis is defined as period when international prices
1 SD above detrended price mean. Controls not reported include birth month, first born, female,
region, wealth index and cubic spline of age in months. No time trend is used. Standard Errors are
clustered at household level.
Table 2.18. Effect of (Log) Local Prices on Height-Quadratic Time Controls
All Ethiopia Malawi Uganda Tanzania
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
FE FE FE FE FE
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Log of Proxy Prices for:
-Early Childhood (7-24mo) -0.72∗∗∗ -0.99∗∗∗ -0.19 -0.60 -0.20 -1.10 3.03 2.62 0.01 -0.19
(0.18) (0.27) (0.48) (0.72) (1.02) (2.27) (1.90) (2.86) (0.75) (1.60)
-Infancy (0-6mo) 0.73∗∗∗ 0.60∗ 0.43 0.69 0.16 1.11 -0.59 -0.71 0.20 0.37
(0.15) (0.26) (0.32) (0.51) (0.50) (1.00) (0.75) (1.09) (0.47) (0.92)
-Third Trimester -0.88∗∗∗ -1.15∗∗∗ -0.78 -1.05 -0.25 -1.72∗ -0.02 -0.58 -0.39 0.07
(0.15) (0.26) (0.40) (0.63) (0.43) (0.79) (0.39) (0.59) (0.28) (0.49)
-Second Trimester 0.19 0.49 0.24 -0.04 -0.06 1.47 -0.22 0.47 0.13 0.29
(0.18) (0.31) (0.40) (0.65) (0.44) (0.93) (0.43) (0.59) (0.29) (0.57)
-First Trimester 0.35 0.04 0.73 1.45∗ 0.17 -0.33 -0.14 -0.37 -0.08 -0.32
(0.18) (0.32) (0.41) (0.65) (0.43) (0.94) (0.44) (0.62) (0.28) (0.53)
-Trimester Before Pregnancy -0.24∗ -0.37 0.25 -0.48 0.43 -0.75 0.86∗ 0.58 -0.02 0.25
(0.12) (0.21) (0.31) (0.47) (0.39) (0.83) (0.38) (0.54) (0.23) (0.45)
Observations 37937 37937 13893 13893 7489 7489 5899 5899 10656 10656
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.187 0.168 0.217 0.069 0.099 0.110 0.141 0.182 0.248
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 Controls not reported include birth month, first
born, female, region, wealth index and cubic spline of age in months. A quadratic time trend is
also controlled for. Standard Errors are clustered at household level.
Table 2.19. Effect of (Log) Local Prices on Height-No Time Trend Controls
All Ethiopia Malawi Uganda Tanzania
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
FE FE FE FE FE
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Log of Proxy Prices for:
-Early Childhood (7-24mo) -0.52∗∗ -1.09∗∗∗ -1.60∗∗∗ -1.48∗∗ 2.06∗∗∗ -3.42 -0.84 -2.00 2.21∗∗∗ -0.57
(0.17) (0.26) (0.32) (0.53) (0.41) (1.98) (1.62) (2.35) (0.56) (1.60)
-Infancy (0-6mo) 0.85∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 0.63 -0.32 1.57 0.20 0.75 -0.51 0.11
(0.14) (0.23) (0.28) (0.44) (0.30) (0.87) (0.66) (0.93) (0.41) (0.90)
-Third Trimester -1.01∗∗∗ -1.17∗∗∗ -0.83∗ -0.90 0.21 -2.18∗∗ -0.27 -1.14∗ -0.23 -0.10
(0.15) (0.26) (0.38) (0.58) (0.41) (0.77) (0.38) (0.57) (0.27) (0.49)
-Second Trimester 0.26 0.49 0.19 -0.12 -0.51 1.68 -0.23 0.75 0.43 0.21
(0.18) (0.31) (0.39) (0.64) (0.40) (0.93) (0.42) (0.60) (0.29) (0.57)
-First Trimester 0.23 0.08 0.75 1.38∗ 0.33 -0.53 -0.24 -0.49 -0.30 -0.29
(0.18) (0.32) (0.40) (0.64) (0.41) (0.92) (0.44) (0.62) (0.28) (0.53)
-Trimester Before Pregnancy 0.04 -0.33 0.00 -0.72 0.84∗ -1.08 0.12 -0.25 0.49∗∗ -0.07
(0.12) (0.21) (0.28) (0.44) (0.34) (0.74) (0.33) (0.44) (0.18) (0.42)
Observations 37937 37937 13893 13893 7489 7489 5899 5899 10656 10656
Adjusted R2 0.134 0.186 0.167 0.217 0.068 0.090 0.107 0.137 0.180 0.247
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 Controls not reported include birth month, first born,
female, region, wealth index and cubic spline of age in months. No time trend is used. Standard
Errors are clustered at household level.
Table 2.20. Local Prices and Probability of Child being Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled Ethiopia Malawi Uganda Tanzania
-Trimester Before Pregnancy 0.0531∗ -0.120 0.0231 0.245∗ 0.0484
(0.0235) (0.0732) (0.0780) (0.116) (0.0598)
-First Trimester -0.0384 0.208 -0.0457 0.0635 -0.0997
(0.0348) (0.119) (0.112) (0.165) (0.0921)
-Second Trimester 0.0145 0.00988 0.0333 -0.223 -0.00833
(0.0345) (0.114) (0.104) (0.158) (0.0908)
-Third Trimester -0.0192 -0.108 -0.0707 0.0901 0.0686
(0.0250) (0.0697) (0.0830) (0.106) (0.0613)
Observations 38874 14366 7666 5899 10943
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 Controls not reported include birth month, region,
and wealth index. Standard Errors are clustered at household level.
CHAPTER 3
THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE ON
INFANT MORTALITY: EVIDENCE FROM A PANEL OF
INDIAN STATES, 1983–1984 TO 2011–2012
Using a panel data set of Indian states between 1983–1984 and 2011–2012, this paper
studies the impact of public health expenditure on the infant mortality rate (IMR),
after controlling for other relevant covariates like political competition, per capita
income, female literacy, and urbanization. We find that public expenditure on health
care reduces the IMR. Our baseline specification shows that an increase in public
health expenditure by one per cent of state-level net domestic product is associated
with a reduction in the IMR by about seven infant deaths per 1000 live births. We
also find that political competition, female literacy and urbanization reduces the
IMR. s JEL Codes: E12, E20.
Keywords: development; healthcare; mortality; south Asia.
3.1 Introduction
Despite rapid economic growth over the past three decades, India has witnessed
very slow improvements in average health indicators of its population. Thus, India’s
position with respect to key indicators of health are below what would be expected
on the basis of its income level. According to data for 187 countries available in the
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2014 Human Development Report, India is ranked 130th in terms of gross national
income per capita (2011 PPP $) but 136th in terms of life expectancy at birth (LEB,
years), 139th in terms of under-five mortality rate (U5MR, deaths before the age of
five years for every 1000 live births), and 140th in terms of the infant mortality rate
(IMR, deaths before the age of one year for every 1000 live births).
One of the possible reasons for India’s relatively worse performance on health
indicators could be the low level of public health expenditure (Rao and Choudhury,
2012). India has not only one of the lowest levels of public health expenditure, but it
also has one of the most privatised health care systems in the world (Sengupta, 2013).
Drawing on data for the period 1995–2013 from the World Development Indicators,
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 highlight these important facts about India’s health care system.
In Figure 3.1, we see that India has much lower public health expenditure (as a
share of GDP) than most other regions of the world, including sub-Saharan Africa.
Moreover, it has remained relatively stagnant over the last two decades, hovering
around one per cent of GDP, whereas sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab World both
have more than double that amount of public health expenditure for the same period.
Figure 3.2 highlights the other important fact about India’s health care system: its
reliance, to a predominant extent, on a privatised system. For the period between
1995 and 2013, public expenditure has accounted for much lower than 40 per cent
of total expenditure on health care in India. This is far lower than what is seen in
other parts of the world, including sub-Saharan Africa.
In poor countries like India, public health expenditure is an important compo-
nent of progressive policy. Large hospitals with expensive equipment and facilities,
proper sanitation, safe drinking water, nutritional programs, and similar interven-
tions with impact on average health status can only be properly supported by public
policy. Moreover, where household incomes are low and credit market imperfections
high, the vast majority of the population are unable to provide adequate health care
through private expenditure. Recent studies have noted the poverty deepening im-
pact of out-of-pocket payments for health care (Garg and Karan, 2009; Shahrawat
and Rao, 2012), which points to an important distributional aspect of public health
expenditure in a poor country like India. Hence, public expenditure can be an im-
portant mechanism to ensure health care services to the population, especially the
poorer sections of the population.
If public health expenditure in the context of a poor country like India has any
positive impact on health outcomes, which seems likely, then India’s exceptionally
low level represents a potentially large opportunity. If it could increase its public
health expenditure to the level of sub-Saharan Africa or Latin America, and if in-
creases in public health expenditure have a positive impact on health outcomes, then
India could rapidly improve the health status of its population. Such considerations
have often been noted by Indian policy makers. The recently released Draft National
Health Policy 2015 notes that perhaps ‘the single most important policy pronounce-
ment of the National Health Policy 2002 articulated in the 10th, 11th and 12th Five
Year Plans, and the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) framework was the de-
cision to increase public health expenditure to 2 to 3 % of the NDP’ (MoHFW, 2015).
A similar target was also recommended by an earlier High Level Expert Group on
Universal Health Coverage (Rao and Choudhury, 2012).
While the need for increasing public health expenditure seems necessary from
a policy perspective, existing studies on the issue present at best a mixed picture.
While some report that public health expenditure has very little effect, if at all,
on health outcomes (Filmer and Pritchett, 1999), others find some positive impact
(Anand and Ravallion, 1993). This is also true for the few studies that focus on
India. Studies that use state-level panel data sets usually report that there is no
significant relation between public health expenditure and health outcomes (Kaur
and Misra, 2003; World Bank, 2004; Makela et al., 2013). On the other hand, some
studies that have used individual level cross-sectional data from the National Family
and Health Surveys do find some effect of public health expenditure on the IMR
(Bhalotra, 2007; Farahani et al., 2010).
In this paper, we revisit the issue of the effect of public health expenditure on
health outcomes in the context of Indian states, focusing on a single health outcome,
namely the IMR.
There are two reasons for focusing on states in India. First, as we explain in
greater detail below, even though health is a joint domain of state and central gov-
ernments, the former play a much larger role in funding health service provision.
Under India’s constitution, State governments are dominantly responsible for health
provision, both in terms of health care and public health measures (Gupta and Rani,
2004). This brings in variation in public health spending across states that can be ex-
ploited to estimate its effect on health outcomes, as we do in this paper. Second, the
advantage of studying states within India is that data on public health expenditure
and other key covariates is largely consistent and comparable. Hence, our statelevel
analysis allows us to avoid many difficult issues related to data comparability that
becomes important in cross country settings.
We use the IMR as the key health outcome for our study because it is widely
accepted among demographers, health economists, and policy makers as one of the
most important indicators of the well-being of a population. In India, the acceleration
of the rate of growth after the economic reforms in the early 1990s was accompanied
by a slowdown in the rate of decline in infant mortality (Dreze and Sen, 2002).
Following a period of rapid decline in the 1970s, the IMR in India stagnated for close
to a decade, before declining again. For instance, the IMR in India fell from 80 (per
1000 live births) in 1990 to 68 in 2000 and further down to 50 in 2009. Even as
average IMR for India has declined over the past few decades, states have displayed
large variation in their performance. While some states like Kerala, Maharashtra
and West Bengal have shown rapid improvement and are on their way to meet the
Millenium Development Goals by 2015, others like Bihar, Gujarat, Orissa and Uttar
Pradesh have lagged far behind (NIMS et al., 2012).
Using this observation as the point of departure, this paper aims to investigate the
factors that determine the spatial and temporal variation of the IMR across Indian
states, with a specific focus on the effects of public expenditure on health. Building
on the empirical framework in Pritchett and Summers (1996), Filmer and Pritchett
(1999), and NIMS et al. (2012), we use a panel data set for 31 Indian states and
union territories between 1983–1984 and 2011–2012 to analyse the impact of public
health expenditure (as a share of state-level net domestic product, NDP) on the
IMR, after controlling for other relevant covariates like the female literacy rate, per
capita net state domestic product, political competition (which can affect the quality
or effectiveness of policy), sex ratio (females per 1000 males), and urbanization.
We find that public health expenditure has a significant effect on the IMR, that
is, states that have higher public expenditure on health, as a share of their NDP,
have lower IMR. Our preferred specification shows that an increase in public health
expenditure by 1 per cent of state-level NDP can reduce the IMR by about seven
infant deaths per 1000 live births. Our results also show, in line with existing results,
that political competition, female literacy and urbanization reduce the IMR. Our
preferred specification shows that an increase in the effective number of political
parties (our measure of political competition) by one unit would reduce the IMR
by about 1.8; an increase in the female literacy rate by 10 percentage points would
reduce the IMR by 9.5; and an increase in the share of urban population by 10
percentage points would be associated with an IMR reduction of 3.3.
In discussing how our results compare with previous findings in the literature
that point to a weak effect of public health expenditure on the IMR, we focus on the
possibility of simultaneity bias as a potential problem with such findings. While it is
intuitively plausible that higher public health expenditure will reduce the state-level
IMR, it is also possible that there is a causation running in the opposite direction.
States (or countries) with sub-par health outcomes are likely to increase their public
health expenditure. In fact, it has been documented that, in India, the states that
perform worse in terms of health outcomes also register a larger public health ex-
penditure as a share of state GDP (Rao and Choudhury, 2012). If the bi-directional
causality between public health expenditure and the IMR holds, then the OLS esti-
mate of the effect of the former on the latter will be biased. Another key contribution
of this paper is to address this possible problem of endogeneity in two ways.
First, we use a simultaneous equation model to capture the bi-directional causality
between public health expenditure and the IMR. Using this model, we show that the
asymptotic bias in the OLS estimate of the effect of public health expenditure on
the IMR is likely to be positive. To the extent that researchers have been unable to
adequately address the problem of endogeneity, this can partly explain why many
studies report insignificant effects of public health expenditure on the IMR: since the
expected sign is negative (because higher public health expenditure is expected to
reduce IMR), a positive bias will push the OLS estimate towards zero.
Second, using a panel of 31 Indian states and union territories between 1983–
1984 and 2011–2012, we estimate the causal effect of public health expenditure on
the IMR using an instrumental variables strategy. We use two fiscal variables as
instruments for public health care expenditure: a state’s own tax revenue and own
non-tax revenue. Both of these fiscal variables can be expected to increase the ‘fiscal
space’ of the states, and thereby enable them to devote more resources to improving
the health status of its population (Heller, 2006). Thus, while it is clear that the
instruments would be correlated with the endogenous regressor, public health ex-
penditure, we go through a series of robustness checks to ensure that they meet the
exogeneity condition. In addition, we include a full set of controls that have been
highlighted as important determinants of IMR in existing studies: political competi-
tion (Chibber and Nooruddin, 2004; Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006; Fumagalli et al.,
2013; Ashworth et al., 2014), female literacy (Subbarao and Raney, 1995; Caldwell,
1986, 1990; Anand and Barnighausen, 2004), per capita income (Pritchett and Sum-
mers, 1996), urbanization (Van de Poel et al., 2009; NIMS et al., 2012), sex ratio
(Jayaraj, 2009), and state and year fixed effects (World Bank, 2004).
In addition to addressing long-standing debates in health economics and demog-
raphy, our research also has immediate policy relevance. Even as India has grown
rapidly over the past three decades, health indicators (infant mortality rate, life ex-
pectancy at birth, calorie intake, child malnutrition, prevalence of anemia in women,
and so forth) of the vast majority have improved, if at all, sluggishly. Policy makers
have been puzzled by this apparent disconnect between economic growth and im-
provement in living standards. A clue to this puzzle is provided by the results of
this paper: public health expenditure has been stagnant over this period of growth.
This could potentially explain why India has not witnessed big health improvements
despite rapid economic growth.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 3.2, we introduce the
empirical model and discuss the issue of simultaneity bias; in section 3.3, we de-
scribe our data sources; in section 3.4, we discuss our main results; and, section 3.5,
concludes the discussion. Details about data sources are collected in the appendix.
3.2 Empirical Model
To motivate the empirical investigation in this paper, let us start with a discussion
of Figure 3.3. It is a scatter plot of public health expenditure (as a percentage of
state-level NDP) against the infant mortality rate for a pooled sample of 31 India
states and union territories over the period 1983–1984 to 2011–2012. The scatter
plot also includes the line from a bivariate regression of the IMR on public health
expenditure and a constant. The line slopes downward, suggesting that state-years
with higher public health expenditure witness lower IMR. Our primary interest in
this paper is to investigate whether the effect of public health expenditure on IMR,
as depicted by the regression line in Figure 3.3, can be interpreted as a causal effect.
To address the question of causal effect, we will need to address two sets of issues.
First, the scatter plot and regression line in Figure 3.3 leaves out many other
covariates that could be correlated with both public health expenditure and IMR.
To account for the possible effect of such determinants of IMR, we can use the
following structural relationship:
yit = zitα1 + x
′
itβ1 + µi + δt +
∑
r
ηrt+ 1,it, (3.1)
where i = 1, 2, . . . n indexes states, t = 1, 2, . . . T indexes years (so that we have a
total of N = n× T observations), yit denotes average IMR, zit denotes public health
expenditure (expressed as a percentage of state-level GDP), x′it is a ((k−1)×1) vector
of controls that include the female literacy rate, per capita net state domestic product
(expressed in 2004–2005 prices), the degree of political competition (measured by
the effective number of parties in state governments), the sex ratio (measured by
the number of females for every 1000 males) and urbanization rate, µi denotes a
state-level fixed effect, δt is a year fixed effect, and
∑
r ηrt are regional time trends.
The set of controls corresponds to important determinants of the IMR that have
been highlighted by existing studies. Most studies find female literacy rate to be
important because standard public health interventions that can reduce the IMR is
enhanced by the ability of the mother to read and follow basic instructions (Caldwell,
1986, 1990; Subbarao and Raney, 1995; Anand and Barnighausen, 2004). Per capita
real income is an important determinant because it acts as a proxy for the level of
private expenditure that can complement public expenditure in improving health
status (Pritchett and Summers, 1996). Effective political competition is often found
to have beneficial impacts on health status of the population (Besley and Kudamatsu,
2006; Fumagalli et al., 2013). The sex ratio (females per 1000 males) is a proxy for
the level of patriarchal attitudes in society, with a lower sex ratio corresponding
to a more onerous burden of patriarchy (Jayaraj, 2009). Urbanization is meant to
capture the relative difference in the availability of health infrastructure, such as
hospitals, primary health centers, doctors, nurses, between rural and urban areas
(NIMS et al., 2012). Finally, state fixed effects control for unobserved state-level
factors that change slowly over time, like cultural norms or attitudes of government
officials, and time fixed effects control for factors that impact all states over time,
like technological change.1
1We could not include any health infrastructure variable or efficiency measure in our model
due to lack of data, but our variables incorporate the determinants of differences in such measures
between the states. There are few state-level studies on aspects of health care efficiency in India
(Kathuria and Sankar, 2005; Shetty and Pakkala, 2010; De et al., 2012; Prachitha and Shanmugam,
2012). These studies mainly focus on the major states, and, although their findings agree on
some degree of heterogeneity with regards to the relative efficiency of health care at the state-
level, they differ to a great extent in terms of their models and understanding of the determinants
of efficiency. The distinction that is most relevant for the purposes of our analysis is whether
the variables in our specification (mainly public health expenditure, female literacy, income and
urbanization) are considered as directly affecting the efficiency of the health care system, that is,
considered as input variables in the production function, or as exogenous variables that affect the
relative efficiency but not the production function. In the former case, these variables are used in
estimating the efficiency level, whereas in the latter case, the level of efficiency is measured focusing
on infrastructure variables (such as the number of primary health centers, sub-centers, doctors, and
The second issue that we need to address in interpreting the observed relation
between public health expenditure and IMR (Figure 3.3) relates to dealing with the
possibility of bi-directional causality and, by implication, the problem of simultaniety
bias. In the next section, we present a discussion of the simultaneity bias and how
we address it.
3.2.1 Simultaneity Bias
To fix ideas, let us posit the bi-directional causality in terms of two structural
relationships. The first is a re-written version of (3.1), and captures the causal effect
of public health expenditure (PHE), z, on the IMR, y,
yit = zitα1 + u
′
itβ1 + 1,it, (3.2)
and the second captures the causal relationship running in the opposite direction
from IMR (y) to PHE (z)
zit = yitα2 + v
′
itβ2 + 2,it, (3.3)
so forth), and the efficiency measure is then regressed on non-health system determinants of health
(including our control variables) to find out the factors that affect the relative efficiency (Kinfu and
Sawhney, 2015). The discussion of the appropriate approach to measure efficiency of the health care
system is beyond the scope of our paper; suffice it to say that our control variables are shown to
have significant effect (direct or indirect, depending on the study) on the efficiency level, and their
effect appear to dominate the effects of various infrastructure variables when used in combination
in an efficiency estimation model (see, for example, Prachitha and Shanmugam (2012)). Hence,
these results suggest that our variables, along with state and year fixed effects, capture the effect
of differences between states in terms of efficiency of the health care.
where i = 1, 2, . . . n indexes states, t = 1, 2, . . . T indexes years, u′it = (1, u1,it, u2,it, . . . , uk−1,it, )
and v′it = (1, v1,it, v2,it, . . . , vk−1,it, ) are k-vectors of strictly exogenous variables (in-
cluding a constant), β1,β2 are vectors of parameters, and 1,it, 2,it are structural
errors with  1,it
2,it
 ∼
 σ21 0
0 σ22
 .
Basic economic theory and intuition suggests that the partial effect of PHE on the
IMR will be negative so that α1 < 0; similarly, the partial effect of the IMR on PHE
is likely to be positive, so that α2 > 0. Since the expected sign of α1 is negative,
a positive bias might lead to an estimate of α1 that is close to zero. Thus, models
that do not address the simultaneity bias will produce weak estimates for the effect
of PHE on the IMR, and this may offer a partial explanation for the predominance
of such findings in this literature. To deal with the possible problem of endogeneity
of public health expenditure and the resulting simultaneity bias in (3.1), we will use
an instrumental variables estimation strategy.
3.2.2 Identification through Instrumental Variables
We will use two different fiscal variables as instruments for public health expen-
diture: a state’s own tax revenue, and a state’s own non-tax revenue. In India, total
revenue of a state is the sum of tax and non-tax revenue (in the main, the latter are
user fees for various services offered by the government). The tax revenue, in turn, is
the sum of own tax revenue (tax revenue collected by the state government) and tax
revenue provided by the Central government.2 Similarly, the non-tax revenue is the
sum of own non-tax revenue and grants from the Central government. Thus, the sum
of a state’s own tax and non-tax revenue can be used to capture the ‘fiscal space’
of a state.3 The larger the tax and non-tax revenue a state can collect, the easier
will it be for the state to finance public health expenditure. We will discuss possible
concerns about the exogeneity of these two instrumental variables extensively when
we discuss robustness checks of our main results in section 3.4.3. Let us first present
the data set used for the analysis in this paper.
3.3 Data: Variables and Summary Statistics
We use an unbalanced panel data set covering the period between 1983–1984 and
2011–2012 for 31 Indian states and union territories: Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal
Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chandigarh, Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Delhi, Goa, Damand &
Diu, Gujarat, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Lakswadeep, Madhya Pradesh,
Maharashtra, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Orissa, Puducherry, Pun-
2In India’s federal structure, tax collection is divided between the central and state govern-
ments. The central government collects direct taxes like income, corporation & personal, dividend
and wealth tax, and indirect taxes like central excise, customs, and service tax. On the other
hand, state governments collect the value added tax, excise on alcohol, luxury tax, electricity duty,
entertainment tax, stamp duty, property tax and professional tax.
3Heller (2006, pp. 75) defines fiscal space as ‘the capacity of government to provide additional
budgetary resources for a desired purpose without any prejudice to the sustainability of its financial
position.’
jab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal.4 Here, we provide a
brief description of the data set; for more details, see the appendix.
3.3.1 Variables
The outcome variable of interest in our analysis is the state-level infant mortality
rate (IMR). The IMR is the probability of death faced by infants of age one year or
lower, and is measured as the number of deaths of infants under one year old per 1000
live births. The key explanatory variable for our study is state-level public health
expenditure (PHE). We measure PHE as the sum of the state-level expenditure on
medical & public health, family welfare and nutrition.
In India, public health expenditure is undertaken at all three levels of government:
central (federal), state, and local. The central government undertakes expenditures
in two forms: direct expenditure, and grants-in aid to state governments. State
governments incur expenditures out of the grants-in aid and other resources, for
example, tax revenues, available to them. Some state-level expenditure also takes
the form of transfers to local government bodies. Local government bodies, in turn,
incur expenditures out of these transfers and from other resources that they have.
The total of all the expenditures incurred at the three tiers of government provides
an estimate of public health expenditure in India. In this paper, we are interested
in analyzing the effect of state-level public health expenditure on state-level IMR.
Hence, the data for our research project relates only to state-level expenditure on
4In the early 2000s, the states of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand were carved out of
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, respectively. For comparability, we keep them as part
of the larger states all through.
health care. This includes expenditures incurred by state governments from Central
grants-in aid and from other resources available to the state government (for example,
through taxation).5
An important source of variation that might be correlated with both PHE and
the IMR is the general quality of policy making and implementation of public welfare
schemes at the state level. Previous studies have documented that political compe-
tition improves policy making (Besley and Case, 1995; Rodgers and Rodgers, 2000;
Besley et al., 2005). Perhaps more pertinent for this paper, many recent studies have
found that the degree of political competition has beneficial effects on health status
of the population (Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006; Fumagalli et al., 2013). The link
in question seems intuitively clear: intense political competition between political
parties can lead to an increase in the effectiveness of governance and accountability
5Thus, our data set does not include direct central government expenditure and local-level
expenditure funded by resources other than state-level transfers. According to NHAC (2009),
the local-level expenditure funded by resources other than state-level transfers is a negligible part
of total expenditure. While we would have liked to include each state’s portion of total central
government expenditure on health, we are unable to do so because of lack of easily available data
on the state-wise distribution of central government expenditure on health. According to data
compiled by Gupta and Chowdhury (2014), the bulk of health care spending is contributed by
states. In 2010–2011, about 64 per cent of total public health care spending came from expenditure
by states, about 31 per cent came from expenditure by the central government (direct expenditure
and grants-in aid to states), and the rest was accounted for by expenditure of local government
bodies. If we count the grants-in aid as part of state-level expenditure, then the contributions
of the central government varies between 20 and 30 per cent of total public health expenditure
(Choudhury and Nath, 2012). Thus, the figures for state-level public health expenditure used in
this paper covers between 70 and 80 per cent of total public expenditure on health care in India.
Yet, because our health outcome of interest is the infant mortality rate, which is likely to respond
to even low levels of increases in public expenditure, and because, as stated above, under India’s
constitution, state governments, rather than the central government, are primarily responsible for
health provision, both in terms of health care and public health measures (Gupta and Rani, 2004),
our data is expected to cover the part of total health expenditure at the state-level that is most
pertinent to our analysis.
of the organs of the state, both of which can lead to an improvement in policy mak-
ing. This can not only force state governments to devote more resources to welfare
activities (like health care), but also improve the effectiveness of existing delivery
mechanisms that have a direct impact on health status for every level of resource
allocation. Moreover, higher level of political competition may provide incentives for
the political parties to increase public expenditure on education, healthcare, nutrition
and so forth, to increase their chances of getting re-elected.
Borrowing from the political science literature, we use an index of the index of
effective number of parties in the government as a proxy for the degree of political
competition in the state government, a process that is accentuated by the growth
of coalition governments over the last two decades in India (Laasko and Taagepera,
1979). For state level assembly election years, the index of the effective number of
parties in any state government is computed as
N =
1∑n
i=1 p
2
i
where N is the effective number of parties in a state government, i = 1, 2, . . . , n
indexes parties in the state government, and pi is the share of party i in the gov-
ernment.6 The value of the index remains unchanged until the next election year,
when a new government is formed and a new configuration of parties emerge as the
6This measure of the effective number of political parties was first proposed by Laasko and
Taagepera (1979). Although many alternatives have been proposed over the years, it is still con-
sidered as the standard for comparative political research (Kline, 2009). Chamon et al. (2009, p.4)
note that starting with Laasko and Taagepera (1979), the political science literature has used the
effective number of parties as ‘the main measure of political competition.’
governing coalition. If a single party forms a government, the value of N is unity,
and as the number of parties increase, the value of N increases.
While we have highlighted the possible positive impact of a higher number of effec-
tive political parties through more intense political competition, it is worth pointing
out that it might also have an opposite effect. If the effective number of political
parties is understood as a measure of the ‘hyper-fractionalization’ of political power,
then a higher value of the index can lead to higher rent seeking behaviour, and mili-
tate against expenditures that are in the long term benefit of the general population.
For instance, coalition governments with a higher number of parties in the ruling
coalition make the coalition unstable and increase the probability of dissolution of
the government before the end of the full five year term. This increases the incentive
for each party in the coalition to make expenditure that cater to their narrow support
bases, rather than undertake expenditure that would have long term benefits for the
population. Thus, depending on the strength of these opposite effects, the effective
number of parties might have a positive or negative effect on the IMR.
The additional controls used in the model are the following: per capita real
income, population sex ratio, (adult) female literacy, and urbanization.7
3.3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics, mean and standard deviation, for the
variables used for the analysis in this paper. Summary statistics are reported roughly
every five years roughly spanning our sample period from 1983–1984 to 2011–2012.
7Details of the definitions of all variables and data sources are available in Appendix.
The average IMR has declined secularly over time, falling from 91.18 in 1985–
1986 to 36.35 in 2010–2011. The average public health expenditure (which includes
medical & public health, family welfare, and nutrition) as a share of state-level NDP
increased over the decade of the 1980s, but has more or less declined since then. It
started rising again from the mid-2000s.
The degree of political competition, as captured by the index of effective number
of parties in state governments, has increased over the sample period. The mean of
the effective number of parties increased from 2.13 in 1985–1986 to 2.37 in 1990–
1991, and remained relatively unchanged for the next five years. Since then, it has
increased almost continuously: the mean of the effective number of parties was 2.36
in 1995–1996, 2.60 in 2000–2001, and 2.94 in 2005–2006.
Female literacy and per capita real NSDP have both increased secularly over the
two and a half decade period from 1983–1984 to 2011–2012. The (adult) female
literacy has nearly doubled over this period, increasing from 42.12 per cent in 1985–
1986 to 70.96 in 2010–2011. Average per capita real NSDP has increased by about
3.2 times over the sample period (from 13227 rupees in 1983–1984 to 42617 rupees
in 2011–2012, both expressed in 2004–2005 rupees), growing at an annual compound
rate of 4 per cent per annum.
The average sex ratio follows a U-shaped pattern: it worsened from 922.12 in
1985–1986 to 917.20 in 2000–2001, and then improved to 925.83 in 2011–2012. Ur-
banization has increased steadily from 1983–1984 onwards, other than a small dip
since the mid-2000s. Average values of both own tax revenue and own non-tax rev-
enue (measured as share of state-level NDP) has been stagnant over the period of
analysis.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Main Results
The main results of our empirical analysis are summarised in Table 3.2. The de-
pendent variable in the model is the infant mortality rate; the independent variables
are public health expenditure (as a share of state-level NDP), effective number of
political parties in state governments, log of per capita net state domestic product
(at constant prices), the female literacy rate, the sex ratio of the population, the
urbanization rate, and state and year fixed effects.
In the first column of the table, we report OLS estimates of the bivariate regres-
sion of IMR on the public health expenditure with state and year fixed effects. The
estimate of the coefficient on public health expenditure is −1.75, but it is imprecisely
estimated. In the next column, we report 2SLS estimates for the same model (with
own tax revenue, own non-tax revenue and the effective number of parties in gov-
ernment as instrumental variables for PHE). The coefficient on PHE becomes −7.17
and is significant at the five per cent level. Given that the OLS estimate is likely to
be biased upwards, this is expected.
As we move from column 2 through 6 in Table 3.2, we keep adding controls:
effective number of parties in state governments, log of per capita NSDP, the female
literacy rate, the sex ratio, and the rate of urbanization. The coefficient on PHE
does not change much, and remains statistically significant at standard levels of
significance.
Our preferred specification is the model in column 6 in Table 3.2, which includes
all the controls, and state and year fixed effects. We will use the estimates in this
model for interpretation. The coefficient of −7.19 on PHE means that an increase in
PHE by 1 per cent of state-level NDP would reduce the infant mortality rate by about
seven (deaths of infants per 1000 live births). This is an economically meaningful and
statistically significant effect and suggests that increasing public health expenditure
would have a large effect on the reduction of IMR in India.8
In Table 3.2, we also see that the effective number of parties, female literacy
rate and urbanization emerge as significant and strong determinants of IMR. An
increase in the index of effective number of parties by 1 unit reduces the IMR by
1.84 per 1000 live births. This suggests that an increase in the degree of political
competition, as captured by an increase in the effective number of political parties
8In their important work, Filmer and Pritchett (1999) report an elasticity of public health
expenditure on the IMR of -0.078 (Filmer and Pritchett, 1999, Table 2). Our estimates suggest
a much larger effect of public health expenditure: the elasticity of public health expenditure (as
a share of NDP) at mean values of IMR and public health expenditure is −0.366 (= (−7.19) ∗
(1.85/36.35)), where we use the mean value of IMR (36.35) and public health expenditure (1.85)
for 2011–2012 (see Table 1 in this paper). The fact that Filmer and Pritchett (1999) get such a
low estimate of the elasticity might be because their instruments, used for the 2SLS estimation,
are weak. They do not report first stage results to argue otherwise. Moreover, the imprecisely
estimated 2SLS coefficients in Filmer and Pritchett (1999) are consistent with weak instrument
problems. In line with Filmer and Pritchett (1999), state-level analysis in India mostly report weak
effect of public health expenditure on the IMR (Kaur and Misra, 2003; World Bank, 2004; Makela
et al., 2013). One study that reports a significant effect is Bhalotra (2007), who restricts the sample
to rural households, allows for lagged effects, and finds a significant effect of health expenditure on
the IMR, with a long run elasticity of about −0.24.
in the government, improves the health status of the population. An increase in
the female literacy rate by 10 percentage points would reduce the IMR by 8.9, and
an increase in the share of urban population by 10 percentage points would reduce
the IMR by 2.8. The direction of these results is in line with existing studies. For
instance, Filmer and Pritchett (1999) and Saurabh et al. (2013) find a significant
inverse relationship between IMR and female literacy. World Bank (2004) finds a
negative effect of adult female literacy on the infant mortality rate only beyond a
threshold per capita GSDP level. Using data from three rounds of the National
Family and Health Surveys, NIMS et al. (2012) find significant effect of the location
of residence (rural/urban) on neonatal and post-neonatal mortality, but weak effect
on child mortality. This suggests two things. First, increasing female literacy must
figure as one of the important elements of any strategy to improve the health status
of the population in India. Second, urbanization improves the IMR, possibly through
better access to basic health care facilities that are lacking in remote and rural areas.
The identification of the causal effect of public expenditure on the infant mortality
rate rests on the validity of our instruments. To assess the validity of our instruments,
we conduct standard tests, and carry out an extensive set of additional robustness
checks (reported in Table 3.4 and discussed below in Section 3.4.3). The standard
tests relate to the strength of the first stage regression, which we capture through
the Kleibergen-Papp (Wald) F-stat, and the overidentification test, captured through
the J-statistic. Both these statistics are reported for all specifications estimated by
2SLS in Table 3.2. All specifications have F-stats that are significantly larger than
10, the rule of thumb value for ruling out weak instrument problems with a single
endogenous regressor. The p-values associated with the over-identification tests are
generally larger than 0.01, which suggests that the instruments pass the exogeneity
test.9
3.4.2 Reduced Form and First Stage Regression
In Table 3.3, we report estimates from the reduced form model, where the de-
pendent variable (IMR) is regressed on the excluded instruments and the included
regressors, and the first stage model, where the endogenous regressor (public health
expenditure) is regressed on the excluded instruments and the included regressors.
The parameter estimates for the reduced form model are meaningful in magnitude
and sign. For instance, both the own tax revenue and the own non-tax revenue
have negative coefficients (though the former is not precisely estimated); both fe-
male literacy and urbanization reduce the IMR. In the first stage regression, the two
instruments, own tax revenue, and own non-tax revenue, have positive coefficients
that are also statistically significant. This implies that increases in own revenue of
states, both tax and non-tax, have a significant effect in increasing fiscal space, and
lead to a reduction in the IMR through this channel.
9Model 7 in Table 3.2 reports results of estimating the model by Limited Information Maximum
Likelihood (LIML) estimation. It is well-known that LIML is less precisely estimated but is also
less biased. Thus, comparing the overidentified model 6 in Table 3.2 (that has been estimated
with 2SLS) with model 7 in Table 3.2 (that has been estimated with LIML) is useful. There is
no significant change in the coefficient on public health expenditure, going from −7.19 to −7.20.
Moreover, the coefficients on effective number of parties, female literacy and urbanization also
remain stable. This increases the confidence in the overidentified 2SLS results of the basic model
(column 6 in Table 3.2).
3.4.3 Robustness Checks
While the KP (Wald) F-stat and the J-stat reported in Table 3.2, in conjunction
with the results of the reduced form and first stage regression reported in Table 3.3,
indicate towards the validity of our estimation strategy, here we discuss some ad-
ditional concerns that might arise about the crucial exogeneity assumption of the
instruments. Since the exoegneity of the instrumental variables means that they
have an impact on the IMR only through their impact on public health expenditure
(PHE), we need to be reasonably sure that there are no other channels through which
the instrumental variables might have an impact on IMR.
A potential cause for our instrument to be non-excludable would be if it was
associated with more efficient or effective government. We limit this possibility in
two ways: (a) we include state fixed effects to control for time-invariant, state-level
factors that might impact effectiveness of government; and (b) we control the time
varying factors that impact effectiveness of government by including the index of
effective number of parties in the state government as a regressor. This measure
of political competition, that is, effective number of parties in state governments,
is well known to be correlated with government efficiency and performance (Besley
and Case, 1995; Rodgers and Rodgers, 2000; Besley et al., 2005). Along the lines
of the earlier papers, Ashworth et al. (2014) find that number of parties has a sig-
nificant positive effect on the productive efficiency of municipal policy. Similarly
Guyvoronskiy (2015) find that electoral competition improves efficiency of public
health care systems in Russia. In the Indian context, Chibber and Nooruddin (2004)
find a relationship between political competition and state government effectiveness.
Hence, we believe that including the index of effective number of parties in the state
government as a regressor in our regression model addresses the concern about ef-
fectiveness of government being an omitted variable that could lead to a violation of
the exogeneity of our instruments.
Another concern might be that rainfall shocks could operate as an omitted vari-
able. For instance, an adverse rainfall shock might reduce agricultural output and
incomes, and thereby lead to higher mortality of infants, and also lead to lower
state-level tax revenue. This is not a problem for our identification strategy because
agricultural income is not taxed in India. A second concern would be that state-level
negative demand shocks would reduce the state-level NDP, leading to higher IMR
and also lower state-level tax revenue. We block off this possible channel by explicitly
controlling for state-level real NDP in Table 3.2.
In Table 3.4, we report additional results that provide robustness checks. Col-
umn 1 reproduces the results for our preferred specification for comparison, and in
columns 2 through 6, we make one change at a time with respect to the preferred
specification to compare the effect of that change on our results.
First, we check for the possibility of own tax and nontax revenue to be correlated
with other items of state level expenditure, such as food subsidy, transfer to the poor,
sanitation & drinking water, that are determinants of state level IMR. We address
this possible concern in two ways. First, we use a broad definition of public health
expenditure that includes expenditure on medical & public health, family welfare,
and nutrition. Second, in column 2 in Table 3.4, we include log aggregate state level
social sector expenditure as an additional control. In column 3, we include log of
total non-public health expenditure (total expenditure less public health expendi-
ture) as an additional control. Neither of these additional controls changes lead to
a significant change in our results in column 1: the coefficient on PHE changes to
−7.19 and −7.84 (the latter is less precisely estimated than would be desirable).
Our second robustness check considers the possibility that the ideological bent
of state governments is correlated with the error term. This might be driven by
the fact that left parties are more likely to favour public over private expenditure
on health care. Political ideology might also have an independent effect on the
IMR through other non-public health spending channels like a generally more pro-
people orientation of policies that improve the quality of services conditional on
the quantity of expenditure. To block this possible channel, we include an index of
political ideology in column 4. To compute this index we first assign an ideology score
ranging from one to five to each political party, with one denoting a Left ideology
and five a Right ideology. The index of political ideology of the government is the
weighted average of ideology scores of the parties in the government, with share of
seats won by parties used as weights. Inclusion of this regressor does not change the
results from column 1 too much with the coefficient on PHE becoming −7.40.
Third, it is possible that states that offer higher quality services might be able
to collect more user fees (and hence, earn more non-tax revenue). If some of these
services improve state-level IMR, then one of our instrument, own non-tax revenue,
would be correlated with the error term. We address this problem by including
lags of PHE (which capture the provision of government services) in column 5. The
results are more or less unchanged, and the coefficient on PHE increases a little to
−12.29. The long run impact of PHE on IMR, that is, the sum of the coefficients
on all the lags of PHE, is −6.60 and statistically significantly different from zero
(p-value = 0.01).
The last robustness check that we report in Table 3.4 is to account for a possible
‘south India’ effect. It is well known that states in south India, like Kerala and Tamil
Nadu, are generally better performing in terms of human development indicators. To
make sure that our results are not driven by rapid improvements in the south Indian
states, we include a south India time trend (a dummy for south India interacted with
a linear time trend) in column 6. Again, the results remain relatively unchanged,
with the coefficient on PHE estimated as −7.04.
3.4.4 Some Caveats
While the results reported in this paper present interesting evidence regarding
the link between public health expenditure and the infant mortality rate, we would
like to draw attention to some possible limitations of our work.
The first area of concern is that the effect of public health expenditure is sta-
tistically quite weak when we restrict our analysis to a sub-sample of 15 major
states–Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka,
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu,
Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. It is common in the literature to see if results
of such cross-state analyses are valid for different sub-samples, like poor versus the
non-poor states (World Bank, 2004), or the 15 major states (that account for the
vast majority of the population, area and economic activity in the country) versus
all states. In Table 3.5, we report results of estimating our basic model for the
full sample of 31 states and a sub-sample of the 15 major states. In addition to
investigating robustness for this sub-sample of 15 major states, we also investigate
robustness for different definitions of public health expenditure by reporting results
for three increasingly comprehensive ways of measuring public health expenditure:
PHE1 = expenditure on medical & public health (% of state NDP); PHE2 = PHE1 +
expenditure on water & sanitation (% of state NDP); PHE3 = PHE2 + expenditure
on nutrition (% of state NDP).
Columns 1 through 3 in Table 3.5 report results for the sample of all states, with
column 1 using PHE1, column 2 using PHE2 and column 3 using PHE3 as the mea-
sure of public health expenditure. It is reassuring to see that the results are robust
to different ways of measuring public health expenditure: the coefficient on public
health expenditure remains stable, and the coefficients on the three key regressors,
namely, political competition (index of effective number of parties in government),
female literacy and urbanization, remain more or less unchanged across columns 1
through 3.
Columns 4 through 6 in Table 3.5 report analogous results for a sub-sample of
the 15 major states. There are two issues worth highlighting. First, the coefficient
on public health expenditure increases in magnitude but is no longer statistically
significant. Looking at the KP-stat for the first stage regression we see a probable
source of the problem of imprecise estimates: the KP-stat is much smaller than the
rule of thumb cut-off of 10, and so the instruments are too weak to predict the
variation in public health expenditure. Second, the statistical significance of two
key regressors is also adversely affected: effective number of political parties and
urbanization are no longer significant explanatory variables. This issue needs further
investigation.
The second area of concern relates to the way we have measured the public
health expenditure, that is, as a share of state-level NDP rather than in terms of
per capita real public health expenditure. Since many existing studies (World Bank,
2004; Bhalotra, 2007; Farahani et al., 2010) have used the second measure, we report
results using this measure - logarithm of per capita real public health care expenditure
- in Table 3.6.10 Following the pattern in Table 3.2, we start with a stripped down
model in column 1 of Table 3.6 (where the log of per capita real public health care
expenditure and effective number of political parties are the only two regressors),
and then add controls one by one. As we move down the columns, we see that
the coefficient on the log of per capita real public health care expenditure remains
negative and statistically significant. In column 7, we add state fixed effects and
that reduces the statistical significance of the coefficient on the log of per capita real
public health care expenditure dramatically. While we suspect that this is a problem
of weak instruments (as suggested by the low value of the KP-stat), we would also
like to flag this issue for further investigation.
10We compute real per capita public health expenditure by deflating the nominal per capita
public health expenditure by a state-level NDP deflator. The deflator is computed as the ratio of
real net state domestic product (at 2004–2005 prices) and the nominal net state domestic product.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the relationship between public health expenditure
and the infant mortality rate using an unbalanced panel of 31 Indian states from
1983–1984 to 2011–2012. To investigate whether the relationship can be interpreted
in a causal manner, we focused on the possibility of bi-directional causation between
public health expenditure and the infant mortality rate. We argued that the simul-
taneity bias arising from bi-directional causation is likely to be positive. Since the
association between public health expenditure and IMR is expected to be negative,
a positive simultaneity bias might explain why many existing studies do not find any
significant negative effect of public health expenditure on the infant mortality rate.
In our empirical analysis, we addressed the issue of simultaneity bias by using an
instrumental variables strategy. We used a state’s own tax revenue, and own non-tax
revenue as instruments for public health expenditure. Our estimation results show
that public health expenditure as a share of state-level net domestic product is nega-
tively associated with the state-level infant mortality rate. Our baseline specification
suggests that an increase in public health expenditure by 1 per cent of state-level
NDP will reduce the infant mortality rate by about seven deaths per 1000 live births.
Our estimate is far more stronger than what has been previously reported in the lit-
erature, for instance in Filmer and Pritchett (1999), and suggest that Indian states
can reduce the infant mortality rate rapidly by increasing the level of public health
expenditure (as a share of state-level NDP), which has been extremely low in the
last decades. We also find that an increase in the degree of political competition,
female literacy and urbanization reduces infant mortality rates.
Appendix: Data Sources
Infant Mortality Rate
The main source of data on the IMR, and other vital health statistics, in India
is the Sample Registration System.There are 4 main sources of vital statistics in
India: (a) Sample Registration System (SRS), (b) Civil Registration System (CRS),
(c) indirect estimates from the decennial Census, and (d) indirect estimates from the
National Family Health Surveys (NFHS). Among these 4 sources, the SRS remains
the most important source for reliable data at an annual frequency (Mahapatra,
2010). The Sample Registration System (SRS) is an annual demographic survey
covering 1.2 million households, one of the largest, continuous demographic surveys
in the world, conducted since 1970 by the Registrar General of India and provides
reliable data on fertility and mortality indicators for the country and larger states
(Mahapatra, 2010). We downloaded state-level IMR data compiled from annual
reports of the SRS by the Government of India and made available through the
Open Government Data Platform India.11
Public Health Expenditure
The state-level public health expenditure data comes from the Economic and
Political Weekly Research Foundation’s India Time Series data base, which, in turn,
uses data from the Handbook of Statistics on State Government Finances published
by the Reserve Bank of India in 2010.For details see http://www.epwrf.res.in/
home.aspx
11See https://data.gov.in/
Broadly, total expenditure of a state government can be broken up into expen-
ditures on three types of services: (a) social services, (b) economic services, and
(c) general services. Expenditures on (a) and (b) combined is called ‘development
expenditure’, and expenditure on (c) is called ‘non-development expenditure’. Each
of the first two expenditure categories can be further broken down into revenue ex-
penditure (current expenditure including interest payments) and capital expenditure
(capital outlays like construction of roads, buildings, irrigation projects). Revenue
expenditures are financed through current income, the main source of which are taxes
and duties. Capital expenditures are not financed from current income, but instead
rely on loans, surplus revenue from previous years, and so forth.
The category that is relevant for this paper is ‘social services’ (category (a) above).
Expenditure on social services is often referred to as ‘social sector expenditure’ and
includes the following sub-categories: education, sports, arts and culture; medi-
cal and public health; family welfare; water supply and sanitation; housing; urban
development; welfare of scheduled castes (SCs), scheduled tribes (STs), and other
backward castes (OBCs); labour and labour welfare; government servants; social
security & welfare; nutrition (expenditure relating to the nutrition program under
child welfare); relief on account of natural calamities; others. Thus, public health
expenditure falls under ‘social services’ and we measure it in the most expansive
manner by including expenditure on medical and public health, family welfare and
nutrition.
Expenditure on ‘medical and public health’ can be broken down, in turn, into
the following sub-categories, with the figures in parenthesis referring to percentages
in 2012–2013: general (4.52%); public health (12.43%); medical education, training
& research (13.2%); rural health services–other systems of medicine (3.03%); rural
health services–allopathy (22.3%); urban health services–allopathy (39.26%); urban
health services–other systems of medicine (5.26%) (NHAC, 2012).
In a similar manner, the components of expenditure on ‘family welfare’ are: rural
family welfare services (45.5%); urban family welfare services (3.28%); maternity &
child health (11.46%); assistance to local bodies (10.35%); training (6.84%); direc-
tion and administration (5.49%). As before, the figures in parenthesis refer to the
percentage in 2012–2013 (NHAC, 2012).
Expenditure on ‘nutrition’ is mainly incurred on account of the Integrated Child
Development Scheme (ICDS). This program includes supplementary nutrition, im-
munization, health check-up, referral services, pre-school non-formal education, nu-
trition & health education. The ICDS is a centrally-sponsored scheme implemented
by State governments. For details, see http://wcd.nic.in/icds.htm
Political Competition
The index of effective number of parties and the index of the ideology of a state
government is constructed from state-level election data available from the website
of the Election Commission of India.For details, see http://eci.nic.in/eci/eci.
html
Other Covariates
The controls in the model are the following: per capita real income, population sex
ratio, women’s education, and urbanization. Our measure of per capita real income
at the state level is per capita real net state domestic product (NSDP). The source for
data on per capita NSDP (at 2004-2005 prices) is the Handbook of Statistics on Indian
Economy, an annual publication of the Reserve Bank of India. We use the sex ratio
(females per 1000 males) as a proxy for the strength of patriarchal attitudes; data on
state-level sex ratios come from various issues of the Economic Survey. For details,
see http://indiabudget.nic.in/survey.asp We measure women’s education by
the (adult) female literacy rate (percentage of females aged 15 and above who can
read, write and carry out simple arithmetic calculations), and use data from the
Open Government Data Platform India. Data on the instruments, state-level own
tax and non-tax revenue, is downloaded from IndiaStat.12
12For details, see http://www.indiastat.com/default.aspx
Figure 3.1. Time series plot of public health expenditure (% of gross domestic
product) for major regions of the world and India, 1995-2013. Source: World Devel-
opment Indicators, World Bank.
Figure 3.2. Time series plot of public health expenditure (% of total health ex-
penditure) for major regions of the world and India, 1995-2013. Source: World
Development Indicators, World Bank.
Figure 3.3. Scatter plot of public health expenditure (% of state-level net domestic
product) and infant mortality rate (IMR) across India states, 1981-2012, with a linear
regression line. Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics
1985–1986 1990–1991 1995–1996 2000–2001 2005–2006 2010–2011
IMR 91.18 58.01 58.58 49.98 41.78 36.35
(27.15) (28.04) (21.95) (22.03) (18.11) (13.93)
PHE (% of SNDP) 2.04 2.84 2.19 2.19 1.74 1.85
(1.18) (2.07) (1.30) (1.54) (1.47) (1.62)
PCPHE 2.57 3.94 3.67 5.12 6.51 9.60
(1.73) (3.36) (2.72) (4.09) (8.99) (11.79)
Female Literacy 42.12 47.51 53.40 59.64 65.36 70.96
(17.30) (17.43) (15.72) (14.07) (12.30) (10.76)
Log PCNSDP 9.55 9.74 9.88 10.07 10.29 10.66
(0.43) (0.41) (0.43) (0.47) (0.50) (0.52)
Sex Ratio 922.12 921.19 919.31 917.20 920.80 925.83
(62.22) (55.04) (54.48) (65.37) (71.45) (76.38)
Urbanization 0.32 0.29 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.35
(0.25) (0.21) (0.17) (0.13) (0.14) (0.19)
Own Tax Revenue 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Own Non-Tax Revenue 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.14) (0.24) (0.11) (0.04)
Parties in Govt 2.13 2.37 2.36 2.60 2.94 2.60
(1.06) (0.89) (0.77) (1.11) (1.49) (0.88)
Observations 31 31 31 31 31 31
This table reports mean and standard deviations (in parentheses below the mean) for key variables
for a selected number of years. IMR = infant mortality rate (deaths of infants under one year old per
1000 live births); PHE (% of SNDP) = public health expenditure, that is, expenditure on medical &
public health, water & sanitation, and nutrition, measured as a percentage of the state-level NDP;
PCPHE = per capita real PHE (at 2004−2005 prices); Female Literacy = proportion of women aged
15 years and more who can read, write and carry out simple arithmetic calculations; PCNSDP =
per capita net state domestic product (at 2004− 2005 prices); Sex Ratio = females per 1000 males;
Urbanization = proportion of population living in urban areas; Own tax revenue = total tax revenue
less the tax revenue transferred by the central government (measured as % of state NDP); Own
non-tax revenue = total non-tax revenue less the amount transferred from the central government
(measured as % of state NDP); Parties in the government = index of the effective number of political
parties in the state government (a proxy for the degree of political competition).
Table 3.2. Basic Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PHE -1.75 -7.17* -8.33** -6.85** -6.92** -7.19** -7.20**
(0.198) (0.089) (0.033) (0.044) (0.039) (0.030) (0.030)
Parties in Govt -2.52** -2.50** -2.11** -2.04* -1.84* -1.84*
(0.035) (0.049) (0.039) (0.071) (0.086) (0.086)
Log PCNSDP -2.69 -2.51 -2.50 -2.04 -2.04
(0.387) (0.397) (0.399) (0.461) (0.461)
Female Literacy -0.86*** -0.85*** -0.89*** -0.89***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Sex Ratio 0.03 0.04 0.04
(0.847) (0.737) (0.737)
Urbanization -28.43*** -28.44***
(0.007) (0.007)
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
KP (F-stat) 242.612 207.323 197.124 182.776 190.297 190.297
P-value (J-Stat) 0.709 0.553 0.827 0.836 0.895 0.895
N 677 548 540 532 532 532 532
The dependent variable in all regressions is the state-level infant mortality rate. PHE (% of SNDP)
= expenditure on medical & public health, water & sanitation, and nutrition (% of state NDP);
Parties in Govt = effective number of parties in the government; Female Literacy = proportion of
women aged 15 years and more who can read, write and carry out simple arithmetic calculations;
PCNSDP = per capita net state domestic product (at 2004-2005 prices); Sex Ratio = females per 1000
males; Urbanization = proportion of population living in urban areas. P-values (clustered by state)
appear in parenthesis below estimates; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Specification 1 is estimated
by OLS. For all other specifications public health expenditure has been instrumented with own tax
revenue, and own non-tax revenue. Models 1 through 6 have been estimated by 2SLS; model 7 has
been estimated by LIML. The KP (F-stat) refers to the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic for weak
identification; the J-stat refers to Hansen’s overidentification test.
Table 3.3. Reduced Form and First Stage Estimates
(1) (2)
Own Tax Revenue -46.68 8.27*
(0.701) (0.055)
Own Non-Tax Revenue -14.72** 1.84***
(0.017) (0.000)
Parties in Govt -1.87* 0.00
(0.076) (0.854)
Female Literacy -0.85*** -0.01
(0.002) (0.466)
Log PCNSDP -1.78 -0.02
(0.435) (0.924)
Sex Ratio 0.05 -0.00
(0.712) (0.773)
Urbanization -21.59* -0.94*
(0.076) (0.068)
State Fixed Effects Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y
Observations 532 532
Specifications (1) and (2) refer to the reduced form and
first stage regressions, respectively, for the model referred
in specification (6) in Table 3.2. All variables as defined
in Table 3.2. P-values (clustered by state) in parenthesis;
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Table 3.4. Regression Results: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PHE -7.19** -7.19** -7.84 -7.40** -12.29** -7.04**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.158) (0.029) (0.010) (0.027)
Parties in Govt -1.84* -1.83* -1.73 -1.71 -1.48* -1.75
(0.086) (0.092) (0.132) (0.110) (0.097) (0.104)
Female Literacy -0.89*** -0.90*** -0.79*** -0.91*** -0.87*** -0.74***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
Log PCNSDP -2.04 -2.10 2.72 -1.71 -1.41 -3.48
(0.461) (0.464) (0.777) (0.543) (0.543) (0.201)
Sex Ratio 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.00
(0.737) (0.735) (0.796) (0.871) (0.471) (0.977)
Urbanization -28.43*** -28.86*** -34.08*** -27.83*** -25.75** -34.42***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.000) (0.009) (0.026) (0.000)
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Log SPHE N Y N N N N
Log NPHE N N Y N N N
Index of Ideology of Govt. N N N Y N N
Pub Health Exp (2 Lags) N N N N Y N
South India Time Trend N N N N N Y
KP (F-stat) 190.297 189.882 14.498 182.647 49.582 218.232
P-value (J-Stat) 0.895 0.893 0.336 0.936 0.947 0.823
N 532 532 507 532 497 532
The dependent variable in all regressions is the state-level infant mortality rate. SPHE = total state-
level social sector expenditure less public health expenditure; NPHE = total state expenditure less
public health expenditure; all other variables are as defined in Table 3.2. P-values (clustered by state)
appear in parenthesis below estimates; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. For all specifications, public
health expenditure is instrumented with own tax revenue, and own non-tax revenue. The models
have been estimated by 2SLS.
Table 3.5. Regression Results with Three Definitions of Public Health Expenditure
and in 15 Major States
All States 15 Major States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PHE1 -10.84* -28.25
(0.099) (0.275)
Parties in Govt -1.90* -1.79* -1.84* -1.85* -1.61 -1.73
(0.059) (0.083) (0.086) (0.079) (0.154) (0.203)
Female Literacy -0.96*** -0.94*** -0.89*** -1.18*** -1.15*** -1.01***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.006)
Log PCNSDP -2.78 -2.09 -2.04 -6.54 -5.94 -8.98
(0.245) (0.451) (0.461) (0.208) (0.397) (0.632)
Sex Ratio 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.11 -0.11 -0.14
(0.756) (0.721) (0.737) (0.433) (0.465) (0.558)
Urbanization -30.29*** -29.53*** -28.43*** -52.95* -43.78 -59.53
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.099) (0.316) (0.594)
PHE2 -7.93* -16.91
(0.083) (0.544)
PHE3 -7.19** -25.97
(0.030) (0.711)
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
KP (F-stat) 118.302 91.882 190.297 2.336 1.832 0.247
P-value (J-Stat) 0.661 0.756 0.895 0.585 0.258 0.215
N 532 532 532 415 415 415
The dependent variable in all regressions is the state-level infant mortality rate. PHE1 = expenditure
on medical & public health (% of state NDP); PHE2 = PHE1 + expenditure on family welfare (% of
state NDP); PHE3 = PHE2 + expenditure on nutrition (% of state NDP); all other variables are as
defined in Table 3.2. P-values (clustered by state) appear in parenthesis below estimates; *p<0.10,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. For all specifications, public health expenditure is instrumented with own tax
revenue, and own non-tax revenue. The models have been estimated by 2SLS.
Table 3.6. Regression Results with Key Independent Variable as Log of per capita
Real Public Health Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log PCPHE -38.35*** -19.64*** -14.04*** -14.03*** -15.74*** -16.79*** -3.48
(0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.821)
Parties in Govt -12.87*** -10.83*** -6.17*** -6.18*** -6.36*** -6.28*** -1.96*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.056)
Log PCNSDP -17.83*** 0.07 0.03 2.97 6.68 1.77
(0.006) (0.989) (0.995) (0.675) (0.502) (0.895)
Female Literacy -0.89*** -0.89*** -0.88*** -0.81*** -0.84***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sex Ratio -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.04
(0.992) (0.983) (0.989) (0.743)
Urbanization -20.78 -29.95 -23.00*
(0.351) (0.210) (0.099)
State Fixed Effects N N N N N N Y
Year Effects N N N N N Y Y
KP (F-stat) 19.112 10.076 8.898 7.711 6.995 5.645 4.594
P-value (J-Stat) 0.019 0.804 0.689 0.667 0.587 0.615 0.064
N 541 541 533 533 533 533 533
The dependent variable in all regressions is the state-level infant mortality rate. Log PCPHE =
logarithm of per capita expenditure on medical & public health, family welfare, and nutrition deflated
by the state-level NDP deflator; all other variables as defined in Table 3.2. P-values (clustered by
state) appear in parenthesis below estimates; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. For all specifications,
public health expenditure is instrumented with own tax revenue, and own non-tax revenue. The
models have been estimated by 2SLS.
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